Russia\u27s Intactable Economic Problems and the Next Steps in Legal Reform: Bankruptcy and the Depoliticization of Business by Kratzke, William P.




Russia's Intactable Economic Problems and the
Next Steps in Legal Reform: Bankruptcy and the
Depoliticization of Business
William P. Kratzke
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
William P. Kratzke, Russia's Intactable Economic Problems and the Next Steps in Legal Reform: Bankruptcy and the Depoliticization
of Business , 21 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 1 (2000-2001)
ARTICLES
Russia's Intractable Economic
Problems and the Next Steps in Legal




In August 1998, the Russian government defaulted on its own debt, or-
dered private borrowers to default on foreign loans, and provoked a collapse
of the country's banking system. The government also abandoned its sup-
port of the ruble. The ensuing monetary crisis reflects the state of the Rus-
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sian economy. 1 The value of Russia's currency, as with the value of any-
thing, depends upon demand for it. Quite simply, there is not a great de-
mand for Russia's currency, and the reason for that is that a ruble does not
buy very much of what the world's consumers want. The monetary crisis
revealed as never before the fundamental weakness of the Russian econ-
omy. The source of Russia's economic woes is its unique legacy of social-
ism-a legacy that has not died.
Russian socialism was an incredibly inefficient system, surviving for
as long as it did through various means including access to abundant natural
resources, dedication to the cause, and force. It is unfortunate that the sys-
tem survived so long, because the Soviet Union's legacy is an economy that
suffers from massive distortions. Such distortions greatly inhibit efforts to
move to a market economy. Economic distortions in Russia, as with eco-
nomic distortions anywhere, occur because the distortions are rewarded
outside of or irrespective of competitive market forces.
Law reform in Russia proceeds on many fronts. This paper takes the
position that the most important legal reforms for Russia are those that
eliminate the reward system that encourages economic activity that can be
highly inefficient. These legal reforms are an effective bankruptcy law and
the de-politicization of business. The two go hand-in-hand. It is the politi-
cization of business that renders Russia's bankruptcy laws ineffective by
making non-viable business entities .appear to be solvent. These two re-
forms, were they adequately implemented, would eliminate rewards for in-
efficiency. Only when the Russian government-and its people-have
removed this reward system can conditions affirmatively conducive to
growth be fostered and a business environment competitively attractive to
foreign investment established. This position is by now uncontroversial,
but the paper examines such reform in the context of the obstacles to its
achievement.
I. THE LEGACY OF A COLD WAR SOCIALIST ECONOMY
The Soviet Union's demise left in its wake at least two enduring lega-
cies. First, the Soviet Union bequeathed to Russia many inefficient and/or
needless enterprises created to serve the socialist ideal. Second, the Soviet
Union bequeathed to Russia citizens with a sense of entitlements, obliga-
tions, and ethics that is antithetical to a capitalist or market economy. Both
of these bequests have proved to be substantial barriers to Russia's transi-
tion to a market economy.
See Strobe Talbott, Dealing with Russia in a Time of Trouble, ECONOMIST, Nov. 21,
1998, at 54, 57 ("A nation's currency is a key manifestation and underpinning of its sover-
eignty - and its unity. This century has already shown that hyperinflation can destroy states,
or turn them into monsters.").
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A. The Value of Russian Enterprises
The Cold War was a war, and the Soviet Union lost. The implications
of losing this type of war seem not fully to have been absorbed by many in
the West. No enemy occupied Russia's territory and imposed a particular
political, economic, and legal system. Therefore, the Russians have had to
invent their own political, economic, and legal system. Some think that the
current economic policy caused the troubles that prevail in the former So-
viet republics. Although the policy might have exacerbated economic
problems, it did not itself create the problems.
The Cold War was a war of nerves, fought on many fronts. Weapon
build-ups and limited conquest followed by consolidation were manifesta-
tions. But the Soviet Union lost the Cold War economically, and lost it de-
cisively. Before surrendering, countries that lose wars resort to desperate
measures, the magnitude of that desperation dependent on the nation's de-
termination to win the war. The Soviet experience in World War II cer-
tainly demonstrates its determination to win wars. In a "hot war,"
destruction of capital assets comes from without, e.g., from enemy bombs.
One recalls photographs of factories and buildings reduced to rubble in
post-war Germany. One now sees some of the same sights in the capitals of
the former republics of the Soviet Union.2 The economies of the countries
comprising the former Soviet Union imploded.
The government of a nation that loses an economic war finds itself
woefully short of resources for infrastructure maintenance. The Russian
government simply lacks the necessary resources for roads, libraries, hos-
pitals, education, etc. A walk through a post-Soviet city confirms this.
Roads and sidewalks are allowed to deteriorate. There are few additions to
libraries made after 1989. What were once manicured lawns of the campus
of Moscow State University are now fields of weeds a foot high or more;
the University's fountains are now empty basins.
The Soviet Union fought its economic war against capitalism. Capi-
talism, whether by design or by accident, is a system founded upon the core
principle that value should be maximized. Value is a measure of a con-
sumer's willingness to pay for something or of an owner's willingness to
sell something he/she already owns.3 When a consumer is willing to pay
more for a good or service than its actual price, the excess is surplus value.
When a seller sells for a price greater than the lowest price at which it
would be willing to sell, the excess is surplus value. In any transaction vol-
untarily entered, surplus value should be created for both purchaser and
2 In Chisinau, Moldova, for example, the roofs of abandoned buildings in what should be
the "high-rent" office district of the city are literally falling in. Yet no bombs fell on this
city. The Moldovan economy simply is not productive enough to generate the funds neces-
sary to maintain these buildings.
3 See RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12 (5"' ed. 1998).
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seller. This surplus value contributes to the wealth of both buyer and seller.
The wealth of a society is maximized when sellers freely compete without
interference and on a level playing field to meet consumer desires. Suffi-
cient competition compels sellers to identify consumer needs and desires
and then to meet those needs and desires at the lowest possible price, which
is the marginal cost of production. The freedom to enter markets that
should prevail in a capitalist system assures that there is sufficient competi-
tion and that only those who can market products at a price that creates sur-
plus consumer value can stay in business. Consumers, by the choices that
they make, determine the goods and services that are produced and establish
the prices that they are willing to pay. This market economy disciplines
those who fail to create surplus consumer value. So long as demand is not
artificially stimulated, e.g., by subsidizing production (or purchase) of one
product so that it can be sold (or purchased) at less than its marginal cost of
production at the expense of an otherwise superior substitute, productive re-
sources should gravitate to their most valuable use. When there is no com-
bination of uses of productive resources that would improve consumers'
utility, there is allocative efficiency.4 Rigid adherence to the principle that
competitive markets should be allowed to work assures maximization of
consumer surplus value from the resources available. No political system
achieves such efficiency, but hopefully deviations should neither be wide-
spread nor without purpose. Deviations quickly result in sizable distortions
as evidenced by the dislocations caused by removing an impediment to such
efficiency.5
Socialism-whatever its ostensible virtues-proved to be a system that
did not maximize value because the competition necessary to such value
maximization was lacking. A centrally planned economy is not responsive
to consumer demand6 and might be driven by very different considerations,
4 See MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 53
(1996) (i.e., and more technically, when the slope of consumers' indifference curve and slope
of production possibility curve are equal).
5 Upon U.S. approval in fall 1999 of China's admission to the World Trade Organization,
garment workers complained that such admission would cost 150,000 American jobs. And
Ross Perot, of course, may be most remembered for his observation in the 1992 presidential
election campaign that a "giant sucking sound" would follow ratification of the North
American Free Trade Agreement as American jobs were lost to Mexico. These "losses"
really represent removal of significant distortions that impeded the working of the law of
comparative advantage. Such distortions do not take long to develop, but seem to require
considerable pain to remove.
6 See JOSEPH R. BLASI, MAYA KROUMOVA & DOUGLAS KRUSE, KREMLIN CAPITALISM:
THE PRIVATIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY 27 (1997) ("In a free market economy, the
managers of a factory depend on the market to tell them what to produce, and the profits of
shareholders, the compensation of workers, and their own bonuses depend on the success of
the business"); Special Section, Freedom r Journey: A Survey of the 2 0 h Century, "The
Strange Case of Karl and Adolf," ECONOMIST, Sept. 11, 1999, at 8, 9 ("Even the most bril-
liant bureaucrat could not consistently work out what product to make next, how much of it
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e.g., national security.7 What consumer surplus Soviet-style socialism did
create was relative only to the value created in transactions occurring in the
Soviet Union's own closed, non-competitive system. Such a system creates
far less wealth than a capitalist system. Central planning's blessing given to
an inefficient producer is the means by which this shortfall occurs. The
magnitude of the shortfall turns on the extent to which central planners
claim a role in a nation's economy. In the Soviet Union, central planning
was pervasive. The objective of the manager of an enterprise was not
profit, but fulfillment of Gosplan's quota. The skills necessary to fulfill this
objective had little to do with profit maximization, but had everything to do
with obtaining necessary supplies.8 Soviet socialism could focus on some
specific and rather narrow objectives, e.g., building and amassing weapons,
saber-rattling, exploring space, and winning Olympic gold medals. Soviet
socialism generated very little wealth for ordinary consumers. If Soviet so-
cialism were capable of generating a comparatively significant amount of
consumer wealth, it would not have collapsed. In Russia, seventy-five
years spent without market discipline assured inefficiency on a massive
scale.9 In fact, with rare exceptions, enterprises created less value than the
value of the resources that they consumed.10
Former Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar has characterized the Soviet sys-
tem as one of soft budget constraints and hard administrative constraints.
On the one hand there was little concern with profit, but great concern with
fulfillment of administratively-specified objectives. Failure to turn a profit
would be compensated with subsidies, loans on easy terms, and tax ar-
rears.11 A capitalist recognizes that the Soviet system had it exactly back-
ward. Value maximization requires hard budget constraints and soft
administrative constraints. The fact that the Soviet government could not
keep information concerning the wealth (as here defined) of citizens in
thriving capitalist economies from its own citizens assured the demise of
Soviet socialism. Increased demand by Soviet consumers for better prod-
to make, or how to make it more efficiently. The market is the only way yet found to con-
duct experiments about these things and to discover people's changing preferences. Com-
mand economies conducted no experiments and worked by ignoring preferences").
7 See Michael D.V. Coco, Towards Enterprisation: Shareholder Rights and Economic
Reform in Russia, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 169, 170 (1998) (for example, national security consid-
erations might dictate siting a factory in Siberia, many miles from the site of raw materials,
thereby increasing transportation costs).
8 See BLAsI, KROuMOVA & KRUSE, supra note 6, at 27 (managers were often unaware of
products' cost or whether plant made profit).
9 Cf. id. at 17 ("Though the Soviet economic machine could claim enormous industrial
and agricultural output, it was very inefficient.").
10 See MAXIM BOYCKO, ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT VISHNY, PRIVATIZING RUsSIA 33-38
(1995) (describing inefficiency of Soviet socialism).
11See Yegor Gaidar, Lessons of the Russian Crisis for Transition Economies, FIN. &
DEV. (IMF), June 1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, Findev File.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 21:1 (2000)
ucts simply could not be met by such a system. Great quantities of bad or
unwanted products, even when sold at low prices, do not create wealth. 12
In fact, paying the salaries of workers who produce unwanted goods is an
implicit form of unemployment compensation. 13
The first wave of privatization in Russia revealed graphically how
poorly socialism performed compared to capitalism. Privatization of course
involved selling off the productive assets of Soviet socialism. Purchasers of
such assets could certainly foresee competition from others and from the
West in an openly competitive environment in selling products to Russian
consumers. The prices paid were stunningly low. Many, but not all, Rus-
sian firms were so inefficient that they were practically worthless. 14 The
"implied aggregate value of the Russian industry was under $12 billion.
That is, the equity of all of the Russian industry, including oil, gas, some
transportation and most of manufacturing, was worth less than of that of
Kellogg or Anheuser-Busch."15 There are various partial explanations for
this, not least of which is that the manner in which privatization had to oc-
cur made the implied aggregate value of all Russian firms appear to be less
than it really was. There was very little wherewithal to purchase equity in-
terests in firms, resulting in depressed prices, although this is belied by the
fact there was $15 billion of capital flight in 1992.16 Workers and manag-
ers were permitted to buy their shares on the basis of a firm's "book value,"
i.e., the original cost of buildings, equipment, and assets-but not land. 17
Presumably, such assets were worth more than their original costs, but
maybe not. Worst of all, Russian socialism-with its extensive political
interference in managerial decisions that are routinely made by private enti-
ties in capitalist countries--created a misalignment of the interests of prof-
its and control. 18 Shareholders, who should profit from their ownership
12 Cf. Gregory Feifer, Luzhkov s Guinea Pigs, Moscow TIMEs, May 16, 2000, available
at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File (thousands of autos produced by Moskvich and ZiL,
irrespective of demand).
13 See Leon Aron, A Second Go at a 'Second Economic Revolution'?, AEI RussIAN
OUTLOOK 2 (Summer 2000), at http://www.aei.org/ro/rol1988.htm.
14 See BoYcKo, SHLEIFER & VISHNY, supra note 10 at 119.
15 Id. at 117. The largest employer in Russia, VAZ, a manufacturer of automobiles, sold
for $45 million. United Energy Systems, the utility owning most of Russia's power plants
sold for $746 million. See id. at 118. "...U.S. manufacturing companies have market values
of about $100,000 per employee. Russian manufacturing companies, in contrast, obtained
voucher auction values of between $100 and $500 per employee. The difference is about
200-fold!" Id.
16 See id. at 119-20.
17 See BLAsi, KROUMOVA & KRUSE, supra note 6, at 42.
18 See BoYcKo, SHLEIFER & VISHNY, supra note 10, at 120-21, who offer the following:
The most plausible explanation for Russian industry's low valuation lies in the theory of
inefficient ownership and the misalignment of cash flow [i.e., profit] and control rights.
Voucher auction prices reflected the values of the companies to outside investors, who
received legal cash flow rights but ... relatively few control rights. The control rights
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interests, in fact have very little power to control most corporations in Rus-
sia. In Russia, shareholders may have ownership interests, but control re-
sides with managers 19 who may divert assets for their own benefit. Great
control powers also reside with local governments, especially when local
governments have the will to keep non-viable firms in business.
The performance of socialism can be crudely compared to the per-
formance of capitalism by noting the experience of Germany after reunifi-
cation. West Germany and East Germany emerged from World War II
devastated-but presumably in nearly identical conditions. Both had es-
sentially the same quality and proportional quantity of human capital.
When West Germany absorbed East Germany, not a single factory in East
Germany could operate at the efficiency levels that consumers routinely
demanded of western suppliers.20 The German government has spent bil-
lions and will have to spend billions more to bring a major part of its econ-
omy to efficiency levels routinely assumed in the West.2 1 No doubt, this
contributed to the electoral defeat of Helmut Kohl.
were held primarily by managers, who had an interest in value maximization because of
their high ownership stakes, but had other interests as well.
The problem of managers simply diverting assets for their own use has not disappeared,
although it has been reduced by privatization. In addition, to consolidate control against
potential interference by outside investors, some managers cater to the workers who still
own the majority of shares. Many Russian firms continue to pay for housing., child care,
hospitals, schools and other services for their employees, a practice that is likely to con-
tinue unless managers stop needing worker support, or unless a better social safety net is
provided by the government. When managers and workers join together to spend the
profits of a company they control, outside investors are unlikely to have much left over.
Perhaps most importantly, many companies are stuck with managers who lack the
knowledge and ability to carry out restructuring, but who value their jobs too highly to
leave despite their high ownership....
Still, managerial discretion is probably not the whole explanation for the low valuation,
since such problems also often exist in the West in a milder form. The low valuations
suggest that the depoliticization of Russian firms has not been complete, and politicians
maintain extensive control over companies. Even with sectoral ministries out of the pic-
ture, residual control enables politicians to expropriate shareholder wealth through regu-
lations, restrictions on product mix and layoffs, custom duties and many other
interventions, including the threat of potential nationalization. Continued politicization is
surely the main reason that outside investors pay so little for Russian assets.
19See BLAsI, KROUMOVA & KRUSE, supra note 6, at 106-07 (describing management
conduct to gain control of workers' shares).
20 Cf James Arnold, Not the Real Thing, Bus. CErr. EuR., Nov.-Dec. 1998, available at
http://www.bcemag.comfy1998/dez98/Cover/9812cover.htm (noting that Avtovaz factory in
Russia requires 450 man-hours to produce car; much better car produced in western Europe
with 28 man-hours); Feifer, supra note 12 (Moskvich and ZiL require 30 times the worker-
hours of western manufacturers to produce automobile, but labor costs 5% of labor costs in
the west).
21 See Peter Gumbel and Carla Anne Robbins, Rethinking an Empire: The New Russia,
WALL ST. J., May 28, 1996, at Al ($600 billion spent between 1990 and 1996; "torrent of
funding" expected to continue for five to ten more years).
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B. Soviet/Russian Citizens' Attitudes and Expectations of Government
The New Soviet Man did not materialize-at least not universally.
Two significant characteristics of Russian people that the Soviet system did
create (or perpetuate) were (1) a regard for laws and a sense of ethics, or
right and wrong, that is at odds with that prevailing in the West in many re-
spects, and (2) an aversion to risk coupled with a sense of entitlement to a
wide array of social benefits well beyond those that citizens of most west-
ern countries expect.
1. Business Ethics, Right and Wrong
The labor theory of value of course held that the value of any good or
resource depended on the labor necessary to produce or capture it. Value
had no other source; value certainly could not be a reflection of demand for
one resource relative to the demand for another and should not be measured
through a common medium like money. With this as a basis of socialist so-
cial contract, Soviet socialism developed its own set of legal rules and
norms of ethical behavior. This is not to say that everyone was ethical.
While socialism is a system designed to create equality, individuals,
even those living in and indoctrinated in a socialist system, sought status
and/or material possessions. 22 Status could become the source of material
wealth. During the Brezhnev years, if not before, much that was valuable
that the economy might produce was taken (i.e., stolen) by those in a posi-
tion to do so.23 Many managers accumulated wealth by diverting to them-
selves or to friends factory output at the artificially low prices established
by the state. Resale or export brought substantial profits.24 Such behavior
of course is quite inimical to the survival of socialism. Productivity levels
in such an environment were quite low.
Perestroika was an effort to reverse this trend through compromise-
much as Lenin's New Economic Policy was a mere euphemism for the crea-
tion of value through private enterprise in an economy that otherwise would
not survive. During perestroika, rights of control devolved from politicians
to enterprise managers. Giving managers a stake in the success of their en-
terprises should have prompted them to increase productivity and quality.
Instead, such persons profited either from collecting bribes or diverting the
2 See Leon Aron, The Strange Case of Russian Capitalism, AEI RUSsIAN OUTLOOK 2,
Winter 1998, available at http:l/www.aei.org/ro/ro8906.htm ("Ferocious individualists, jeal-
ously protective of their private space, resourceful and wily fighters for personal amenities -
[Russians] were at once dependent on the state for everything and deeply resentful, cynical,
and hostile to it ...").
2 See BOYCKO, SHLEIFER & VISHNY, supra note 10, at 37-38 (managers with rights of
control but no rights to cash could accumulate wealth by collecting bribes); ROSE BRADY,
KAPITALIZM: RussIA's STRUGGLE TO FREE ITS ECONOMY 49 (1999) ("thievery and bribery.")
24 See BLASI, KROUMOVA & KRUSE, supra note 6, at 34 (extent to which factory manag-
ers took advantage of their positions may never be known).
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output of their factories; 25 the problem of corruption actually grew worse
during perestroika. Soviet ethics did not function to enhance consumer
value as business ethics should do in market economies.26 Soviet ethics
failed to develop sufficiently pervasively to make the system survive.27
And then perestroika changed the whole ethical construct of Soviet society.
The legalization of private enterprise in the late 1980s became a major
source of widespread ethical confusion. Communist philosophy did not recog-
nize the existence of private property or profits, yet both became legalized, and
even mandated, by Soviet and Russian laws...
This chaotically-evolving legal structure gave little direction to people
engaged in business. Individuals had to define for themselves the proper con-
duct in business relationships. These business people came from different
backgrounds and often held different values ... Some business people were
guided by the values and accepted practices of the former communist system,
others by universal values or religious beliefs, and others by criminal and un-
scrupulous motives. Still others, lacking experience in a market economy,
simply were ignorant of what constituted ethical behavior in such radically
new and uncertain circumstances.
28
Corruption has thrived in such an environment. It is a part of the Soviet
legacy.29 As The Economist noted, "Russia has been, more or less, an or-
derly country for much of its history. But it has practically never been law-
ful.,, 30
It took over seventy years to develop such a business culture; it is cer-
tainly not an entrepreneurial culture.31 Realistically this culture will not
2 See BOYCKO, SHLEIFER & VISHNY, supra note 10, at 38-43.
2 6 For example, business ethics - as well as the Federal Trade Commission Act and con-
sumer protection statutes in most states - would hold that sellers should not falsely advertise
their products. Such rules serve the objectives identified here as those of a market economy,
i.e., maximizing consumer value, in that consumers should not be duped into sending false
signals regarding their preferences to sellers.
27 See Aron, supra note 22 ("Decades of contest with unjust and often irrational rules
turned Russians into a nation of lawbreakers.').
2 8 See Sheila M. Puffer & Daniel J. McCarthy, Business Ethics in a Transforming Econ-
omy. Applying the Integrative Social Contracts Theory to Russia, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L.
1281, 1287-88 (1997).
29 See Scott P. Boylan, Organized Crime and Corruption in Russia: Implications for US.
and International Law, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1999, 2004-05 (1996) (criminal groups al-
ready existed at time of communism's fall; understanding black market under communism
key to understanding difficulty of transition to market economy).
3 0 Russian Organised Crime: Crime Without Punishment, ECONOMIST, Aug. 28, 1999, at
17, 18.
31 See Andrei A. Baev, Implications of Emerging Legal Structures for Capital Markets in
Russia, 2 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 211, 215 (1996) (observing absence of such a culture);
Christopher F. Dugan & Vladimir Lechtman, The FCPA in Russia and Other Former Com-
munist Countries, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 378, 378-79 (1997) (bureaucratic low salaries and de-
clining living standard coupled with opportunities for bribe-taking and under-enforcement of
applicable laws foster environment of corruption).
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change in less than a generation. 32 "Social attitudes and the relationship of
an individual to the state do not necessarily change at the same rate as a
governmental regime, particularly in an environment such as Russia's in
which the fall of the old order has resulted in economic and social chaos.
'3 3
The most effective way to hasten the abandonment of the Soviet mind-set
and adapt to a market economy is to reach the oldest citizens who car still




Seventy-five years of living under Soviet socialism created attitudes
that did not disappear merely because the system disintegrated. Such a pe-
riod created expectations on the part of Soviet citizens of their government.
"After depriving generations of political liberty and economic and social
autonomy, the Communist regime delivered to its successor not citizens but
wards of the state." 35 Russians surely expect more from their government
than those in the West expect from their governments. They typically had
received, either from the government or from their employers, free health
care, education, child care, and pensions. They received subsidies for
housing and utilities.3 6 These items are not typically provided free of
charge by governments in the West. In the United States, the federal gov-
ernment provides incentives for individuals or their employers to provide at
least some of these items through the Internal Revenue Code. Even if an
employer provides them, they are a very real part of any wage package.
Moreover, the employer must be that much more efficient in competing
with those who do not provide such services; generosity does not reduce the
rigors of market discipline. Furthermore, markets for these social services
assure that they are provided efficiently and in a not overly-excessive quan-
tity. In Russia, providing such services may be part of the contractual rela-
32 See No Carrots, Bus. CENT. ER., Nov.-Dec. 1998, available at http://www.bcemag.co
m/y1998/dez98/Survey/9812survey5.htm (Russia persistently fails to abandon notion that
"law is a means to coerce the people, rather than a mutual contract guaranteeing fair play for
all").
33See Coco, supra note 7, at 173.
34 As a Fulbright lecturer, I found college students to be very receptive to change, but
frustrated by the obstacles they confront.
Rather than thinking of subsidies, the Russian government should be stimulating training
and education of thousands of young Russians in the skills of restructuring, turnaround
management, and bankruptcy workouts by sending them as apprentices to the regions of
the major industrialized powers that have faced these crises. The Russian Government
should be using foreign assistance to contract with the best universities in these countries
to offer eighteen-month MBA programs in the restructuring of manufacturing concerns.
BLAsI, KROIOMOVA & KRusE, supra note 6, at 180.
3 5 See Aron, supra note 22.36 See Aron, supra note 13 (federal housing subsidy costs federal treasury 4% of GDP).
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tionship between employers and their employees, but it seriously inhibits
restructuring. 37
The trade-off that existed in the Soviet Union for most citizens was
more security for less material wealth.38 Importantly, Russian citizens of-
ten do not understand that there even was a trade-off.39 They often have an
idealized view of the West where opportunities, money, and superior prod-
ucts seemingly abound and are available to all.40 Upon immigration, many
of them have learned--either adjusting or failing to adjust-of the Western
work ethic and Western norms of responsibility and accountability for one-
self.
In Russia, there remains an unhealthy dependence on the state, coupled
with an unhealthy aversion to risk.
Most Soviet workers are reluctant to make changes... The vast majority have
grown accustomed to leaning on the state. They would rather settle for a mea-
ger wage and miserable living standards-and continue to complain about
these shortcomings-than quit their jobs and take the chance of shifting to a
cooperative with an uncertain future. They would rather pass up higher pay
than take the risk of a cooperative's failure, or face the certain knowledge that
they will have to work harder. Risk and uncertainty are things most Soviets
habitually avoid like the plague.
4 1
It is of course impossible to legislate attitudes. But it should be possible not
to create a legal system and to maintain a political culture that rewards such
misplaced dependence.
What material wealth Russian citizens could acquire when they were
Soviet citizens they often acquired through relationships rather than through
arms-length transactions reflecting choices of how to allocate their re-
sources so as to maximize their own utility. People did favors for each
other,42 and relationships of power and control grew out of such favors.
Status mattered. The end of socialism destroyed the importance of many of
37 See BLASi, KROUMOVA & KRUSE, supra note 6, at 142 ("Any restructuring of social
services stirs serious conflict between the old culture of Russian enterprises and the new de-
mand that they be competitive. It is not a small issue.")
38 Cf. id. at 27 ("[E]mployees received modest wages with significant perks, such as en-
terprise-provided apartments, utilities, cafeterias, a day-care center and a kindergarten, health
care, a vacation retreat, and a cultural center.").
39 Private saving - certainly private saving of money - really had no part in such an
economy. See The Cash Don f Work, ECONOMIST, Dec. 19, 1998, at 98, 99. Rather the state
undertook to provide certain minimum levels of care from cradle to grave.40S ee JANINE R. WEDEL, COLLISION AND COLLUSION: THE STRANGE CASE OF WESTERN
AID TO EASTERN EUROPE 1989-1998 23-24 (1998) (observing that "the model of dependency
on Big Brother, combined with ideas of Western prosperity, had formed the basis for aid ex-
pectations that would be difficult, if not impossible, to meet even under the best of circum-
stances").
41 See HEDRICK SMITH, THE NEw RUSSIANS 192 (1990).
42 See BRADY, supra note 23, at 21 ("Soviet citizens had lived their lives and improved
their lots by engaging in endless informal barter deals").
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these relationships on which productivity depended. With the demise of the
importance of relationships also came economic decline.
4 3
II. PRIVATIZATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE RusSIAN OLIGARCHS
Productive efficiency is the use of resources in such a way that outputs
from those resources are maximized.44 Necessary conditions of maximiz-
ing the value of productive resources are exclusivity, universality, and
transferability, 45 i.e., interests in productive resources must be subject to
exclusive ownership, all resources must be privately owned, and resources
must be freely transferable. Privatization in the newly independent states
represents an effort to (begin to) create these conditions. The principle of
universality requires that privatization continue until the Russian govern-
ment is involved in no more than providing social services.
Privatization in Russia was not (and is not) without opponents, notably
from the communist party.46 Anatoli Chubais had charge of the State
Committee on the Management of State Property ("GKI"), the agency in
charge of privatization. Mr. Chubais wanted to accomplish privatization as
quickly as possible.4 7 This was necessary in order to blunt the opposition
of factory directors and government bureaucrats who naturally (and no
doubt correctly) regarded privatization as a serious threat to their personal
power.48 Chubais sought to depoliticize the economy and assumed that
Russians would respond to financial incentives the same way that citizens
of other countries do.4 9 "The progress of privatization was to depend on the
pull of incentives and not the push of bureaucracy."50 His program endeav-
ored to take into account the interests of various stakeholders in enter-
43 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMIcs 218 (3d ed. 2000) (demise
of Soviet system disrupted long-term barter relationships; failure of cooperation caused pro-
duction to decline).
44See id. at 12.45 See POSNER, supra note 3, at 37-38.
46 For a vigorous critique of the Russian privatization, see WEDEL, supra note 40, at 121-
63 (describing the operation of the Russian privatization process and noting that Russian pri-
vatization benefited favored clans).
47 See Virginie Coulloudon, Privatization in Russia: Catalyst for the Elite, 22 FLETCHER
F. OF WORLD AFF. 43, 48 (1998). The desire for speed probably cost the government in that
it precluded transferring ownership through cash sales. Cash sales would have required
"valuation, information collection, preparation of auctions and public offerings and a variety
of other services which investment banks gladly supply given ample time and generous
fees." BOYCKO, SHLEIFER & VISHNY, supra note 10, at 71; see also BLAsI, KROUMOVA &
KRUSE, supra note 6, at 35-40 (describing competing political interests).
48 See BLASI, KROUMOVA & KRUSE, supra note 6, at 45 (top managers and government
bureaucrats in branch ministries opposed privatization from the beginning); BRADY, supra
note 23, at 66 (factory directors enjoyed great power and feared change).
49 See BRADY, supra note 23, at 66-67.
m BLASI, KROUMOVA & KRUSE, supra note 6, at 45-46.
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prises-which resulted in nomenklatura privatization,51 a compromise (i.e.,
contradiction) of sorts that allowed directors and workers to acquire up to
51% of their enterprises on favorable terms.5 2 While Mr. Chubais's efforts
to implement "shock therapy" were hardly without cost, it probably was the
least costly way of pursuing, and indeed of achieving, privatization.
In the first round of privatization, employees and managers received
substantial rights to acquire shares of their respective enterprises, and they
quickly became the largest groups of shareholders. 53 Worker support of
existing management54 enabled managers to retain control, even when
managers should have been replaced. These aspects of the first round of
privatization plus some other contributing factors (e.g., distribution of non-
voting shares, difficulty of re-selling shares, government's passive owner-
ship of shares) made shareholder oversight of enterprises less than vigi-
lant.5 5 Management did not fear dismissal and had little incentive to
maximize profits for the benefit of the enterprises's shareholders.
56 Signifi-
cantly, this "voucher" privatization, which gave insiders control over firms,
did not generate an infusion of much needed capital.57 Firms' shareholders,
i.e., workers, simply did not have the capital that their firms desperately
needed.58 Such privatization did nothing per se to enhance the capital of
those firms desperately in need of it.
In the second round of privatization, the government planned to sell
enterprises for cash-with part of the proceeds going to the enterprise and
part to the government; the enterprises were also to purchase the land that
they occupied. When it became clear that the government would not be
able to raise the amount of money that it had planned, it postponed the auc-
tions. In stepped a consortium of Russian banks who offered to lend the
Russian government money in exchange for large blocks of shares in Rus-
sia's giant companies as collateral. As with any loan, the consequence of
default is forfeiture of the collateral to the lender. Apparently the govern-
s See BRADY, supra note 23, at 67 (notably employees and managers).
52 See id. at 71 (virtually guaranteeing that entrenched factory directors retained control
of their plants).
53 See BLAsi, KROUMOVA & KRUSE, supra note 6, at 56 (employees of all kinds, rank-
and-file and management, controlled 64.7% of privatized corporations in 1996); Coulloudon,
supra note 47, at 47; see also BRADY, supra note 23, at 64-65 ("nomenklatura privatization").
5 See BOYCKO, SHLEIFER & VisHNY, supra note 10, at 112 (noting worker backing of
managers).
55 See Coulloudon, supra note 47, at 48.56 See id. at 48.
-" Cf Izak Atiyas, Restructuring Programs In Transitional Economies, in CHANGING
POLITICAL ECONOMIES: PRIVATIZATION IN POST-COMMUNIST AND REFORMING COMMUNIST
STATES at 195, 195 (Vedat Milor ed., 1994) (industrial restructuring "should be supported by
a financial package that contains new resources; a reorganization of the liabilities of the en-
terprise, including redistribution of financial claims; and, often, debt relief").58 BLASI, KROUMOVA & KRUSE, supra note 6, at 143 ("pretend capitalists").
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ment has defaulted.59 The government gave those banks who participated
in the "loan-for-shares" program special bidding privileges when the auc-
tions finally did occur. Such firms could acquire a majority interest in such
finms in auctions from which some interests, notably foreign interests, were
excluded. The growing power of such banks enabled them to name the en-
terprises that they wanted the government to support.60 The result was that
various interests were able to buy stakes of desirable companies very
cheaply. For example, Vladimir Potanin purchased a 96% stake in Sidanko
Oil for $530 million; two years later, he sold a 10% stake to British Petro-
leum for $571 million!61  "Rather than creating competition, this
'privatization' transformed lucrative state monopolies into lucrative private
monopolies," 62 i.e., financial industrial groups ("FIGs"), comprised of a fi-
nancial institution and various industrial enterprises.
This "loan-for-shares" program had the consequence of distributing
wealth in a particular pattern-i.e., to what has come to be known as an oli-
garchy-and of the government's surrender of economic power to this
group.63 This group obtained control of some of Russia's gems for very lit-
tle money.64 The reality was that exclusion of foreign interests made possi-
ble insider deals. 65 The fact that little money was raised in the process also
meant that the government treasury did not benefit-and this inevitably
makes difficult government efforts to implement any policy that might be
beneficial. The wealth effects of the actual privatizations-concentration of
wealth in the hands of a very few who are highly visible both in Russia and
in the West and who remain well connected to government agencies-has
created cynicism and disillusion.66 But it is important to note: privatization
59 See BRADY, supra note 23, at 206 (government's view is that shareholders have the
right to sell their shares so long as they sell according to privatization law and they inform
the government at least three months prior to sale).
60 See generally BLASI, KROUMoVA & KRUSE, supra note 6, at 74-76 (describing loan-
for-shares program); BRADY, supra note 23, at 135-43 (describing the loan-for-shares pro-
gram); Coulloudon, supra note 47, at 49-50.
61 See Patricia Kranz, International Business: Russia: Fall of an Oligarch, Bus. WK.,
Mar. 1, 1999, at 44 (describing erosion of Vladimir Potanin's financial empire).62 See WEDEL, supra note 40, at 152.
61 See Coulloudon, supra note 47, at 50.
64 See BRADY, supra note 23, at 140 (e.g., UnExim Bank won 38% of Norilsk Nickel for
$170 million, 25.5% of NorthWest Shipping for $6.05 million, and 51% of Sidanko Oil
Holding for $130 million; International Financial Company won 14.8% of Novolipetsk
Steel; Menatep won control of Yukos Oil Holding); Gary Peach, The Analyst: Political
Factors Dominate Redivision of Oil Industry, Moscow TiMEs, Nov. 16, 1999, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File (1/3 of total national oil production sold for approxi-
mately $1 billion).65 See BRADY, supra note 23, at 141 (comments of Vladimir Potanin).
6See WEDEL, supra note 40, at 132-33 (eprivatization processes shaped the distribution
of wealth in Russian society as well as citizens' perceptions of democracy and capitalism.
Part of the public came to associate the terms 'market economy,' 'economic reform,' and 'the
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did not diminish the overall value of the assets involved-it merely allo-
cated them to some favored parties rather than to others.
Economic theory informs that when the value of productive resources
is not maximized, free transferability of ownership interests will increase
the value of those resources. Unfortunately, obstacles to transfers of inter-
ests in management/employee-owned firms or from the oligarchs has im-
peded such increases in value. It is this point that (now) causes economic
stagnation in Russia much more than the original distribution of ownership
interests. 67 Rather than transfer productive assets to more efficient owners,
the present ownership structure of Russian assets is itself a source of power
and personal wealth.
The oligarchs depend for their power on political connection, not mar-
ket acumen:
[A Russian oligarch] sees business opportunities in terms of political contacts
rather than new products, markets or services. He is an opportunist who can-
not look beyond the short term. His understanding of capital markets, even of
balance sheets, is close to nil. In the West, such a man might be a lobbyist or a
fixer. He certainly lacks the ability to be a tycoon.
68
The oligarchs may control up to 50% of Russia's gross domestic product,
but their political influence has proved to be the more significant. 69 This
aspect of the oligarchy is what is so inimical to the Russian economy. The
oligarchs receive rewards by relying on government to perpetuate distor-
tions in the economy. Competition in Russia is in fact largely for govern-
ment benefits that perpetuate economic distortions.70 And the owners of
such resources do not transfer them to more efficient users, nor are they
taken over by more efficient users.
Neither monopoly nor oligopoly is a stable condition and maintenance
of such conditions comes at a high price. While an oligarchy is not an oli-
gopoly, the economic manifestation of the Russian oligarchy is high con-
centration in several industries that control much of Russia's most desirable
resources. High concentration is not conducive to efficiency, but neither
does a lack of concentration necessarily equate with efficiency. The
West' with dubious activities that benefited only a few people while others experienced a
devastating decline in their standard of living").67 See Baev, supra note 31, at 216-17, 220-21 (1996) (commenting on effect of distribut-
ing shares to managers and employees); Andrei Baev, The Transformation of the Role of the
State in Monitoring Large Firms in Russia: From the State s Supervision to the State s Fidu-
ciary Duties, 8 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 247, 258 (1995) (management performance best judged by
valuation of enterprise in a stock market, but "operation of an efficient stock market requires
that ownership of the enterprise be transferable").
68 See Behind the Throne, ECONOMIST, Sept. 12, 1998, at 76.
69 See BRADY, supra note 23, at 208 (impossible to estimate actual level of control; power
emanates from control of media).
70 See Grigory Yavlinsky, Russia s Phony Capitalism, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 67-68 (May-June
1998) (oligarchs, not consumers, drive markets).
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breakup of abusive economic power in Russia will occur through the emer-
gence and growth of smaller, more efficient, and more competitive compa-
nies. What is necessary is that Russian governments, both federal and
local, create conditions receptive to such companies. Creation of such
conditions will take the form of not favoring the competitors of such com-
panies, irrespective of the seemingly compelling reasons for doing so.
Thus, a critical step that Russian governments, both federal and local, must
take is to leave the forces of competition alone, i.e., not to intervene in the
economy by favoring some-usually inefficient-enterprises over others.
While concentration of Russia's Soviet generated wealth in the hands of a
few may cause social unrest, such concentration did not increase or de-
crease the amount of wealth. As already noted, the value of Soviet era
companies was quite low.
Ironically, the fiscal crisis of August 1998 may have the effect of com-
pelling government to stop providing favors to politically well-connected
oligarchs. By defaulting on domestic debt and allowing devaluation of the
ruble, the government effectively stopped dispensing favors, i.e., subsi-
dies,71 to the banking oligarchs-thereby exposing their greed and misman-
agement. For now, at least they are in no position to go after distressed
companies whose condition is attributable to the same crisis.72 The result
could be either further concentration as oil oligarchs acquire more produc-
tive wealth-or a reduction in concentration as more nimble and efficient
firms survive the crisis. Hopefully the weak ruble will favor the latter
group.
I. RUSSIAN (IN)EFFICIENCY
Privatization effected a certain distribution of Soviet era wealth, but it
did not create modem, efficient, valuable enterprises. Privatization has not
alleviated the enormous economic distortions wrought by decades of central
planning. Rather privatization has merely highlighted those distortions.
The enterprises created under central planning still exist, even though the
government may no longer own them outright. Often, privatization oc-
curred factory-by-factory-with each production unit deemed a company to
be sold.73 These one-factory corporations are hardly the gems that the oli-
garchs sought, but they nevertheless comprise a very substantial portion of
the Russian economy. Political and social forces have prevented necessary
restructuring through merger, consolidation, or closure. Russia has count-
less enterprises that cannot make money, yet they stay in business. This is
71 See Brian Killen, Feature - Russia Economy Improving Though Government Broke,
REuTERS NEWS RELEASE, June 30, 1999 (important that subsidies end).
72 See Kranz, supra note 61, at 44 (describing fall of oligarch Vladimir Potanin).
73 See McKINsEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, UNLOCKING ECONOMIC GROWTH IN RussiA, Cement
3 (1999).
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made possible by an economy founded upon barter, by bankruptcy laws that
simply have not worked as they should,74 and by local governments who
work to perpetuate the system despite its shortcomings. This has come to
be known as the "virtual economy."
75
In fact, many enterprises are so inefficient that the value of their out-
puts is less than the sum of the cost of inputs, e.g., labor, raw materials,
taxes. These enterprises survive by paying their workers in kind, accumu-
lating large tax arrears, and perhaps paying taxes in kind. These techniques
are actually a form of borrowing-forced loans from workers and govern-
ment-or subsidization.76 The cash necessary for such a system to continue
is generated by making export sales, sometimes at less than cost.77 Russia's
"virtual economy" is in fact a natural continuation of the Soviet socialist
economy.78 A form of barter-not familiar to those in the West who may
engage in barter in order to evade income taxes-enables the virtual econ-
omy to endure.
Inefficient enterprises survive because they are able to have value re-
distributed to them from other sectors of the economy, notably the natural
resources sector.79 Arbitrary pricing that creates the illusion of value al-
lowed the virtual economy to emerge in socialist times, and it allows the
virtual economy to continue after the fall of the Soviet Union.
80 Gaddy and
Ickes 81 illustrate this by offering a simple model with four sectors: the
household sector which supplies labor and receives benefits from the gov-
ernment; the government which taxes the other entities and transfers bene-
fits to households; the resource-producing, value-adding sector; and the
value-subtracting manufacturing sector.
A manufacturer may take 100 rubles worth of labor from the household
sector and 100 rubles worth of resources from the resource sector to pro-
74 See BRADY, supra note 23, at 29-30 (in March 1992, 90% of Russian industry bankrupt
by Western standards); Andrew Higgins, Twilight Economy: Lacking Money to Pay, Russian
Firms Survive on Deft Barter System, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1998, at Al (citing example of
plant saved from bankruptcy by barter, debts, and favors).
75 See Clifford G. Gaddy & Barry W. Ickes, RussiaS! Virtual Economy, 77 FORmGN A .,
53, 54 (Sept.-Oct. 1998).
76 See BLAsI, KROuMOVA & KRUSE, supra note 6, at 143 ("a kind of involuntary govern-
ment subsidy"); Gaddy & Ickes, supra note 75, at 57.
7 See Aron, supra note 13, (open and hidden welfare payments in Soviet times paid for
by export sales of oil, natural gas, gold, and weapons, and by domestic sales of vodka).
78 See Marshall I. Goldman, The Cashless Society, 97 CuRRE.B HIsT. 319, 324 (1998).
79 See Gaddy & Ickes, supra note 75, at 57; see Arnold, supra note 20 (natural resource
producers carry the rest of the economy; raw materials producers employ 5% of Russians
and produce almost 35% of GDP; "value-added" manufacturing employs 1/4 of the
workforce and contributes 15% of GDP).
'o See Gaddy & Ickes, supra note 75, at 57.
SI The process by which such inefficient enterprises survive is described in Gaddy &
Ickes. Id. at 53.
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duce an output worth 100 rubles. Thus the manufacturer has used 200 ru-
bles worth of inputs to produce 100 rubles worth of output-a 100 ruble
subtraction from value. But the manufacturer pretends that it has added
value and charges 300 rubles for its output. Others accept the pretense be-
cause they will use the overpriced output in barter with one another or with
the government. The manufacturer can give the resource producer 1/3 of its
output and claim that it is worth 100 rubles. Both the manufacturer and the
resource producer pay the government in kind-also with goods worth 1/3
of the actual tax bill in this model. Because it is not so feasible for the
household sector to accept payments in kind, wage arrears and pension ar-
rears have been a notorious feature of the post-Soviet economy.82 Over-
pricing for purposes of barter is by a multiple of two or three; for purposes
of promissory notes, it is up to five.83 And while the worker seemingly is
quite short-changed in this system, he/she does retain a job, and that seems
preferable to the prospect of unemployment. Other forces contribute to the
persistence of barter as a key element of the Russian economy.
As a general matter, barter emerges as a preferred method of exchange
whenever there is hyperinflation-as Russia has experienced-or when, for
some other reason, money simply does not provide an accurate reflection of
the value of some good or service-as occurred in the Soviet Union when
citizens possessed ample sums of money but could not buy desired goods
(or desired quality) because they were not available.8 4 In such environ-
ments, goods-e.g., good, foreign-made television sets-hold their value
much better than the currency and so can become a preferred way to hold
wealth.85 Barter increases as a share of GDP when an economy is dysfunc-
tional.8
6
Barter has always been a part of both the Russian and Soviet econo-
mies. Russia's pre-revolution economy was agrarian with a large portion of
the population comprised of peasants who dealt with each other on a barter
basis.87 The end of World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution, and the civil
war brought hyperinflation-which increased reliance on barter.88 Central
12 See id. at 57-5 8.
83 See id. at 62; cf. Andrew Higgins, With Banks Ailing, Russians Gain Credit from Trees
and Milk, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 1999, at A8 (worker's salary docked for furniture items far
more than cost of goods in stores).
84 This reality is reinforced by the popular Russian adage "in the old days, there was lots
of money and nothing to buy. Now there is lots to buy and no money."
85 See Virtual Reality: Barter Is the Rule in Russia - and That Has a Price, Bus. CENT.
EuR. (Nov.-Dec. 1998), available at http://www.bcemag.com/y1998/dez98/Cover/9812cove
r.htm ("Russians - rightly it turns out - have never had much faith in the ruble")86 See Goldman, supra note 78, at 319.87 See id.
" See id. at 319-20.
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planning in the Soviet economy with its distortions and shortages perpetu-
ated reliance on barter.89
The inevitable failure of the central planners' omniscience resulted in a
rigid economic plan that required barter in order to fulfill it.9° This in turn
created the need for tolkatchi,9 1 i.e., persons who could come up with what-
ever plant managers needed to fulfill their obligations under the plan. Tol-
katchi usually accepted swaps for these needed goods.92  Tolkatchi
possessed a skill in demand that was quite necessary to the survival of the
planned economy even though their activities were ostensibly illegal.
93
This aspect of the centrally planned economy has not disappeared, and not
surprisingly transactions can get quite complicated-involving several par-
ties to obtain one item.94 The expense of tolkatchi represented a direct
transaction cost, in addition to the very high indirect cost of economic dis-
tortions, of the Soviet Union's centrally planned economy. A system of
"spriral[ling]95 debts and counterdebts"96 is enormously inefficient. 97 Pay-
ments that are non-monetary constitute an enormous drag on an economy.
9 8
Inevitably, there is a costly misallocation of resources. 9 9 It literally is true
89 See BRADY, supra note 23, at 21 ("the distortions and inadequacies of socialist central
planning had turned Russia into a great trading society").
90 See Goldman, supra note 78, at 319-20; see also BRADY, supra note 23, at 49-50 (bar-
ter necessary to overcome inefficiencies of centrally planned economy; "bureaucratic mar-
ket").
91 The translations of the pertinent terms are interesting: ToixaTb: push, give a
push/shove; Tonmaq: pusher, go-getter. See A.I. SMIRNITSKY (director), RUSSIAN-ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 789 (6eh ed. 1962).
92 See Goldman, supra note 78, at 319-20.
93 See id; see also BRADY, supra note 23, at 50 (Soviet trading system bred corruption).
94 See Goldman, supra note 78, at 322 (citing example of purchase of jet plane in ex-
change for natural gas; natural gas bartered by jet manufacturer for cars, tractors, and buses -
in turn swapped for jet engine).95 Because of hyperinflation in 1992 - i.e., a 26-fold increase in prices - and the govern-
ment's response of rigid monetary controls designed to reduce business activity, businesses
learned that inter-firm debt was a means of avoiding the controls. Inter-firm debt grew from
37 billion rubles in January 1992 to 3.2 trillion rubles in August 1992 to 25 trillion rubles in
1994. These figures are not adjusted to reflect the hyperinflation. In January 1998, unpaid
wages and taxes and inter-firm obligations totaled 800 trillion rubles, or 24% of the gross
domestic product. See id. at 322; see also BRADY, supra note 23, at 29.
96 Higgins, supra note 74.
97 See Goldman, supra note 78, at 319 (barter extremely inefficient; high transaction
costs; buyers and sellers never sure what their actual costs and prices are); cf Edmund L.
Andrews, Russia's Huge IOU Market Luring Investment Traders, DALLAS MORNING NEws,
Oct. 19, 1997, at 41A (a trading chain of lOUs can go "across the country and back").
98 See Virtual Reality: Barter Is the Rule in Russia - and That Has a Price, supra note 85
("a World Bank survey of Russian managers ... found that non-cash transactions cost 20-25%
more in terms of time and effort").
99 See id.
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that some plants must store the bulky items they receive in trade for their
output.' 00
It is difficult to know the extent of barter transactions in Russia-just
as it is difficult to know the extent of barter transactions anywhere else.
But: "An official survey of 210 enterprises at the backbone of the economy
estimated that barter, debt-swaps and other non-monetary deals accounted
for 73% of transactions in 1996 and 1997. The businesses surveyed paid
only 8% of their taxes with real ... money."101
Instead of tolkatchi, Russian trading companies now act in post-Soviet
times as intermediaries to make the economy work.102 The trading compa-
nies are profitable while fifty per cent of newly privatized enterprises in
Russia run at a loss.10 3 The trading companies are run by or in the interest
of firms' managers and can be the means by which such managers bilk their
own firms. They are able to exploit price structures by buying at controlled,
artificially low prices, and selling in a market where prices are higher and
not controlled-a very profitable and relatively risk free form of arbitrage.
The interlocking interests between trading companies and some companies
present opportunities for self-dealing that many managers-not subject to
shareholder control--cannot resist.
104
A slightly more sophisticated aspect of the barter economy is what is in
essence a negotiable IOU, i.e., a veksel. 105 This is an IOU issued by Rus-
sian businesses who are short of cash. The Russian government itself uses
veksels when it simply cannot pay cash that it owes. 106 When the govern-
ment issues a veksel with a certain maturity date several months into the
future, the recipient, through a bank or trader, will likely resell it at a con-
siderable discount; the purchaser can later satisfy a tax obligation of the
face amount of the vekse 10 7 This is hardly efficient, yet veksels issued by
the Russian government and private businesses account for 23% of the
country's "cash" transactions.t10 The discount on veksels is considerable-
reflecting the real value of the good whose value is artificially established
loo See Higgins, supra note 74 (citing example of plant that manufactures machine parts
having to store payments of wool, blankets, tablecloths, and flax).
101 Id.; see also Goldman, supra note 78, at 319 (barter occurs in 70% to 80% of the
country's business transactions); Russia's Economic Quagmire, ECONOMIST, Apr. 24, 1999,
at 69, 70 (noting expert's sense that "virtual" economy had increased from 50% of Russian
economy before August 1998 to 70% in April 1999).
102 See Goldman, supra note 78, at 319, 322-23.
103 See id. at 319, 323.
104 See id. (citing example of the Magnitigorsk steel mill paying six times the prevailing
market price for scrap steel; trading company from whom mill made purchase run by brother
of steel mill's general director).
105 See id. (indicating that veksels date from prerevolutionary times).
'06 See id. at 323-24 (1998).
107 See id. at 324 (illustrating such use of a veksel).
lo See id.
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eflecting the real value of the good whose value is artificially established as
the face amount of the veksel.
When customary measures are applied to the virtual economy, i.e.,
barter economy, the data appear much better than they really are. It appears
that all of the private sectors are profitable. 109 "The virtual economy masks
the non-viability of the value-subtracting manufacturer."'110 Increases in
productivity are not necessarily good news when those increases are made
by value subtracting manufacturers-even though economic statistics may
appear to be improving.111 Abolishing the virtual economy would increase
(substantially) the tax burden of productive sectors of the economy, force
manufacturers into bankruptcy, cost workers their jobs, and reduce pen-
sions. 112 Hence the very sectors involved in the virtual economy want to
keep it.113 Paradoxically, some of the reforms that many experts acknowl-
edge to be necessary might actually help the virtual economy to survive.
Tax evasion, corruption, and theft would injure any economy, and the vir-
tual economy is no exception. Reduction or elimination of tax evasion, cor-
ruption, and theft would actually help Russia's virtual economy to
survive.114
Accounting according to Soviet standards facilitates the charade that
Russia's virtual economy is real. The same data regarding a firm yield
vastly different conclusions if Russian accounting standards rather than
western accounting standards are applied.115 Soviet accounting standards-
from which Russian accounting standards are derived-were not designed
to track profit. 116 Rather:
The purpose of accounts is to help the state-formerly the central plan-
ners and now the tax police-stop people from stealing by keeping tabs on in-
ventories-not to help managers develop their businesses.
109 See Gaddy & Ickes, supra note 75, at 59.
10 Id. at 59-60; see also BRADY, supra note 23, at 36 (state enterprise managers fighting
for their jobs, privileges, and lifestyles staved off bankruptcies and layoffs).
' See Gaddy & Ickes, supra note 75, at 62.
"
2 See id. at 60.
113 See id.
114 See Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry Ickes, This Bailout Will Set the Stage for the Next
Crisis, Los ANGELES TIMEs, July 17, 1998, part B at 9 (opinion piece) (eliminating corrup-
tion and tax evasion could have the effect of reducing leakage from the virtual economy).
115 See Andrew Higgins, Go Figure: At Russian Companies, Hard Numbers Often Are
Hard to Come By, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 1998, at Al. The article offers the example of the
Bratsk Aluminum Plant which had a $37 million profit when applying Russian accounting
standards and a $7.4 million loss when applying western accounting standards; see also
Goldman, supra note 78, at 319 (describing Uralmash, a producer of machine tools and ar-
maments; profits by Russian accounting methods of $40 million, but losses by western ac-
counting methods of $50 million).
116 See Puffer & McCarthy, supra note 28, at 1295-86 (during communist period,
"accounting practices were centrally-controlled with the audit function being more of a gov-
ernment inspection than an independent financial audit in the Western sense").
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Soviet accountants served as the state's quartermasters. In a system
driven by production rather than profit, they tracked the flow of inputs and
outputs, heedless of whether value had been added or subtracted, money made
or lost.1
17
The unreality of such accounting is of course magnified if the figures that
track inventory are themselves doctored. 118 Even concepts such as depre-
ciation are applied in such a way that virtual profits are increased. Depre-
ciation schedules do not reflect the real wear-and-tear of a productive asset
nor its useful life. Instead, state-set depreciation schedules prescribe much
longer periods thereby reducing the amount by which depreciation reduces
profit. 119 The Economist noted that "[t]he absence of true price-
information means that nobody can say which firms are adding value and
which are destroying it, including the firms themselves. Rational credit and
investment decisions are impossible, and would remain so even if anybody
were to start wanting to make them."
120
There are still other "advantages" to a barter economy. Cash is vulner-
able to seizure by tax authorities and organized crime.121 Holding money in
banks does not help, as organized crime often owns banks simply to learn
who is able to make substantial deposits. 122 When cash is necessary, it is
raised by selling some of the manufacturer's output in world markets at less
than the cost of production.123 Households may also be capable of raising
cash by selling whatever they can.
124
The effect of a virtual economy on the public sector is particularly
devastating. When taxes are collected in the form of money, they can be
allocated according to priorities with considerable flexibility. But when
taxes are collected in kind, priorities must be shaped by the identity of the
particular resources to which the government has access. Rarely, if ever,
would the priorities established in such a system be the same as they would
be where the government is able to collect taxes in the form of money.
125
117 See Higgins, supra note 115, at Al.
"s See id. (noting that former chief of the State Statistics Committee had been arrested
for skewing numbers in order to help companies avoid taxes).
119 See id. (noting that Russian standards require depreciating a building over 100 years
rather than a more realistic length of time, e.g., 30 years).
120 The Cash Dont Work, supra note 39, at 100.
121 See Gaddy & Ickes, supra note 75, at 60; see also Goldman, supra note 78, at 321
(noting that the more public the operation of a new business in Russia, the more vulnerable it
becomes to crime and extortion; also noting that barter is a tool for evasion of taxes).
122 See Goldman, supra note 78, at 321.
1
23 See Gaddy & Ickes, supra note 75, at 61.
124 See id.
125 See id. at 62-63; see also Higgins, supra note 74 (citing example of a textile factory
that obtained electricity by giving 400 wool blankets to a camp for handicapped children -
the value of the blankets being deducted from the electric company's tax bill).
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The virtual economy has provided stability for people who are highly
risk averse. Despite the fact that western media often relate that one group
or another has not been paid its wages in many months or years, the virtual
economy provides a social safety net. Workers do keep their jobs,126 al-
though their real wages are quite low and certainly less than they would be
if such workers worked in an efficient and profitable plant.127 "Wages go
unpaid most often in those industrial sectors where wages are already
low."1
28
Retaining jobs is particularly important in cities where there are only
one or two factories. 129 The squeeze experienced by workers in such places
who cannot move is especially severe. In the event one group, e.g., coal
miners, makes enough noise, government must play the role of referee in
deciding which of many deserving groups receives wages that are due.
130
Government also plays the role of assuring that activities that could effi-
ciently and profitably export their output, e.g. resource production, continue
to fulfill the needs of Russia's inefficient firms. For example, oil companies
should not be allowed to export too much of their product-only enough to
generate the cash to keep the virtual economy going.131 Russia imposes a
substantial tariff on its own oil exports.
132
The reforms necessary to move Russia's virtual economy to a market
economy are more than simply trying to assure that less value is lost in the
existing system, e.g., by firing managers of state-owned enterprises that do
not pay wages. Rather the reforms must strike at the heart of the system it-
self, e.g., by enforcing bankruptcy laws so that inefficient enterprises are
put out of business and sold off, perhaps asset by asset.133 "[D]etermined
application of bankruptcy laws" would be the most effective action that
could be taken to move the economy away from barter.
134
This would induce a substantial number of factory directors to settle their bills
and pay in cash. Many businesses, including a large number that are officially
operating at a loss, would find the means to pay their bills if there were an ef-
12
6 See BLAsi, KROUMOVA & KRUSE, supra note 6, at 111-12 (unemployment in 1995
only 8% despite fact that production had dropped by half since 1991); Patrice Hill, Making
Do in a TPretend"Economy; Black Market Is Crucial for Russians to Survive, WASHINGTON
TIMEs, Mar. 22, 1999, at Al ("Russians hang onto [the pretend economy] because it enables
them to keep jobs in noncompetitive industries that could not survive outside Russia").
127 See Gaddy & Ickes, supra note 75, at 63.
128 See BLASI, KROuMOVA & KRUSE, supra note 6, at 111.
129 See BRADY, supra note 23, at 32 ("In many town in the Urals, Siberia, and the Far
North, only one or two plants employed and supported entire communities. That's why the
prospect of layoffs and unemployment was truly dangerous").
130 See Gaddy & Ickes, supra note 75, at 63.
"'1 See id. at 63-64.
112 Q 20/ton.
1 See Gaddy & Ickes, supra note 75, at 64-65.
134 See Goldman, supra note 78, at 324.
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fective threat to close down the business, return it to the state, and throw out
the existing management. But there is a political obstacle: throwing not only
the managers but the workers out into the streets could spark civil upheaval.
This is what makes the prospect of meaningful and fundamental reform so
doubtful.13
5
The prospect of bankruptcy would no doubt prompt some firms to
restructure and become efficient.
IV. A GLIMPSE AT THE STATE OF THE RuSsIAN ECONOMY: THE McKinsey
Report
In October 1999, the McKinsey Global Institute published the report
UNLOCKING ECONOMIC GROWTH IN RUSSIA. 136 In the report, the Institute
describes the structure and efficiency of ten different industries: steel, ce-
ment, oil, dairy, confectionery, residential construction, food retailing, gen-
eral merchandise retailing, hotels, and software. The overall efficiency
level of these industries combined is 19% of the United States levels of ef-
ficiency. 137
The concern of this paper is with how certain critical laws affect effi-
ciency-not with the precise level of efficiency. As such, the paper here
notes the structural patterns that the Institute observed in the various indus-
tries with a view towards commenting on the likely effectiveness of the
Russian bankruptcy law on the inefficiencies wrought by the structure of
industries. Without question, much of the structure of Russian industries is
the remnant of central planning. No doubt the planning itself appeared effi-
cient and wise at the time; the disastrous distortions that persist are them-
selves compelling testimony to the total folly of central planning in building
an economy that generates wealth for citizens.
138
A. Company Towns
Soviet planners evidently concluded that an efficient method of pro-
ducing large quantities of some items that seemingly require large plants in
order to achieve efficiencies of scale was to create company towns. This
135 See id.
136 The report is available from the McKinsey Global Institute's home page on the world
wide web: <www.mckinsey.com>. There have been other reports issued by respected or-
ganizations whose conclusions are similar. See Reuters, Basic Reforms Needed for Growth
Says OECD, Moscow TIMES, Mar. 9, 2000, available at LEXIS News Library, Mostms File
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). The McKinsey Global Insti-
tute's report is one that is readily available for free. The report includes an Executive Sum-
mary and separate reports for each of the ten industries noted. Hereinafter, reference is made
to McKNsEY and to the particular industry report or Executive Summary.
'
3 7 See McKINsEY, Executive Summary.
138 See Arnold, supra note 20 (humorous analogy applicable to Russian corporate reform
are directions to a (female?) traveler asking for directions: "Well, I wouldn't start from
here").
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was the pattern in steel 139 and oil. 140 As is the case in any country, disloca-
tions caused by plant closures are particularly acute in company towns.
Russian laws tie social benefits to a worker's current residence, so labor is
much less mobile in Russia than it is in other countries. 141 This point inten-
sifies the worst aspects of company towns. The reduction of the workforce
in a steel town would invite social unrest; moreover, a plant's labor force is
essentially held captive to the whim of monopolistic management who can
simply decide not to pay the wages of labor, at least not until inflation has
eroded the wage's purchasing power. 142
B. Obsession With Job Preservation
Russians are incredibly risk averse in matters of employment. To be
sure, some of this is caused by laws that restrict mobility and the large gaps
in any safety net. Workers regard local governments as responsible for as-
suring continued employment, no matter how thinly the wage pie is sliced.
Nothing could be worse at a time when significant reductions in the labor
forces of various industries would not reduce production at all.143 Local
governments are responsive to this obsession, because widespread unem-
ployment would cause social unrest in their communities. 144 Local gov-
ernments may even retaliate against companies that do lay some employees
off.145 This response helps to perpetuate the industry structures that are so
inefficient.
C. Barter
The prevalence of barter in the Russian economy has already been
noted. Further comment is in order to understand fully the intensity of the
forces that drive Russia to its virtual barter economy. In the industries
noted above, only one branch of the software industry ("project services")
comes close to western levels of efficiency. 146 Productivity is so low in
most Russian industries that a great number of companies should be forced
to quit business. This of course would cause massive layoffs of employees.
Barter allows unproductive companies to survive. They can do business
139 See McKNsEy, Steel 2.
140 See id., Oil 9-10.
141 Cf. id., Confectionary 8 (lack of mobility increases local governments' incentive to
prevent layoffs).
142 See id., Steel 11.
143 See id., Steel 5; Cement 4; Oil 7; Dairy 6; Confectionery 6-7; Residential Construction
6; Hotels 5.
'" See id., Steel 11; Cement 7.
141 See id., Oil 10.
146 See id., Software 1 (72% as productive as United States project services industry).
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with bankrupt customers. 147 They can avoid taxes because barter creates
little or no cash that a tax collector could seize. 148
Thus local governments subsidize the companies that generally are the
most inefficient and where massive layoffs would otherwise be appropriate
from an efficiency standpoint. 149 A local government that itself may lack
money subsidizes inefficient operations through tax arrears150 and cheap
energy. 151 The local government often allocates contracts to, or directs oth-
ers to allocate contracts to,152 the inefficient producers.
153
Even these government-provided benefits or subsidies probably are not
sufficient to assure the survival of some inefficient businesses with far too
many workers. Many local governments affirmatively discriminate against
the more efficient companies 154 by making them pay higher taxes, 155 pay
more for energy, pay higher tariffs,156 endure more harassment and red
tape, 157 and do business from less desirable locations. 158 Local govern-
ments may also preclude efficient producers from implementing layoffs.
159
Such affirmative discrimination can result from discriminatory enforcement
of legal rules, e.g., condoning tax evasion by one group of firms but not by
others.
The more efficient producers struggle to survive and are unable to buy
out 160 or drive the inefficient producers out of business. 161 Efficiency is ir-
relevant. Instead it is connections that count. The well-connected, and of-
ten the most corrupt, receive the government contracts. 162 Managers lose
14 7 See id., Steel 14; Oil 8.
148 See id., Steel 14; Cement 6.
149 Cf. Feifer, supra note 12 (describing City of Moscow's substantial investments in Mo-
skvich and ZiL).
150See McKiNsY, Steel 10; Cement 7; Dairy 7; Confectionery 8; see also Gregory
Feifer, City Investments Range Beyond Mere Carmakers, Moscow TIMES (May 16, 2000),
available in LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File (describing tax arrears owed to City of
Moscow as means of spending money on enterprises).
151 See McKINsEy, Steel 10; Cement 7.
152 See id., Steel 10; Residential Construction 13, 14.
153 See id., Cement 7, Residential Construction 14.
See id., Cement 7; Residential Construction 15 (discriminatory "community gains"
payments); Food Retailing 4, 6 (failure to enforce laws against smuggling and against sales
of counterfeit goods).
155 See id., Food Retailing 4, 6; General Merchandise Retailing 5-6.
1-6 See id., Food Retailing 4; General Merchandise Retailing 5-6.
157 See id., Oil 8, 9; Food Retailing 7 (excessive inspections, etc.); General Merchandise
Retailing 6.
158 See id., Food Retailing I (Executive Summary); General Merchandise Retailing I
(Executive Summary).
159 See id., Dairy 7; Confectionary 7.
160 See id., Cement 7.
161 See id., Dairy 7; Confectionery 9.
162 See id., Residential Construction 14.
Russia's Intractable Economic Problems and the Next Steps in Legal Reform
21:1 (2000)
the incentive to improve efficiency because local governments shield the
losers and obstruct the potential winners.
163
D. Distortions Caused By Central Planning That Persist
Central planning caused some enormous distortions whose effects per-
sist. Russian companies persist in inefficiently producing products for
which there is already a national or even world-wide oversupply. 164 The
persistence results from some of the factors already noted, i.e., the obses-
sion with job preservation in company towns with the consequent efforts to
keep all companies afloat through barter, contract allocation, etc. The ob-
session with job preservation causes the Russian economy implicitly to defy
the law of comparative advantage. Russian steel has been the subject of
dumping claims in several countries.
E. Perverse Incentives
Naturally when efficiency is not rewarded but some other modus oper-
andi is rewarded, there is no incentive to strive for the type of efficiency
that would benefit consumers. In Russia the reward system in place for
those in a position to engage in extensive restructuring or to take a firm into
bankruptcy is perverse. Managers of inefficient firms often benefit from
barter activities and cozy relationships with local governments. They may
themselves own or profit from trading companies who purchase products at
artificially low prices thereby siphoning off whatever profits their compa-
nies generate 165-at the expense of minority shareholders/workers (who
remain employed), suppliers, and government.
V. AN "EMERGING ECONOMY"
Russia's is not a developed economy but an emerging economy. Its
GDP is less than that of Taiwan, South Korea, or India; its GDP per head is
equal to that of Colombia. 166 An economy driven mostly by barter is an
economy based upon relationships, not on contract or a rule of law. 167
' 6' See id., Dairy 12.
'6 See id., Steel 4; Cement 6.
165See id., Steel 12; Cement 8, Residential Construction 15; David Satter, Russia: Its
Place in the Twenty-First Century and the Implications for the United States, 8
DEMoKRIzATrSA 439 (2000) (animating factor in Russian economy theft, not productiv-
ity).
166 See THE ECONOMIST, THE WORLD IN 1999, at 74, 75,76,77.
167 BRADY, supra note 23, at 187 (footnote omitted):
Richard Dean, a partner at Coudert Brothers and one of the most experienced American
lawyers in dealings with Russia, put it this way: "Russia remains a long way from a 'rule
of law' state; it remains a 'rule of relationships' state much like many developing coun-
tries.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 21:1 (2000)
[A]n emerging economy is a polity in which commercial institutions are
changing from a relational orientation to a formal orientation. A formal orien-
tation allows business and businesspersons in emerging economies to enter
into commercial relations with persons and entities outside of that polity.
168
The paper has already noted that such an economy is very inefficient.
1 69
A relation-based economy is a matter of culture. Culture is not easily
changed-and probably not willingly.170 The relationships that drive the
Russian economy exist not only "horizontally," e.g., between traders, but
also "vertically," e.g., between government and governed. The power in a
governmental vertical relationship does not necessarily reside in the gov-
ernment. If the power in a vertical relationship resides outside of the gov-
ernment, the one with power is in a position to call upon government for
special favors unavailable to competitors. Unfortunately, this has occurred
in Russia. 17 1 The consequence has been further economic distortion, with
rewards going not to the efficient but to the well-connected. The well-
connected receive contracts, subsidies, credits, loans, etc. This enables
them to compete with efficient enterprises on a basis other than their own
efficiency. This is hardly an environment conducive to private investment.
VI. NEAR TERM GOALS OF LEGAL REFORM
After the fall of socialism, the Russian economy went into a downward
spiral of barter that itself preserved many of the perverse incentives of the
old system, i.e., to build power and wealth through relationships rather than
through efficiency. At the same time and to varying degrees, foreign aid
money came into Russia. This money did not appreciably ameliorate Rus-
sia's problems, certainly not the problems identified here. The problems
identified here are at least in part cultural, and it is not possible to buy off a
culture.
168 Philip M. Nichols, A Legal Theory of Emerging Economies, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 229,
232 (1999).
169 The prices of two goods expressed in a currency, e.g., dollars, represent the marginal
rate of substitution available to every consumer between those two goods. "[P]rice works
like a mechanism to allocate goods in such a way that consumers cannot make themselves
better off swapping goods with each other." SEIDENFELD, supra note 4, at 9-10.
170 See Nichols, supra note 168, at 232 ("[C]hange in these economies is likely to be slow
because relational institutions are difficult to change").
171 See Virginie Coulloudon, Vladimir Putin's Vertical State and the Embryo of a Hori-
zontal Opposition, 8 DEMOKRATIZATSiYA 421, 422 (2000) (ultimate goal of "FIGs" to estab-
lish for themselves patron-client relationship with Kremlin or regional governors); Melissa
Akin, Stalled Transition, Moscow TIMEs, Nov. 16, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Mostms File (interests of "oligarchs" to manipulate government policy to benefit their
businesses to the detriment of the business climate).
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Nevertheless, there is now an evolution of the Russian business cul-
ture,172 and there is no turning back; but evolution is a slow process. Rus-
sia's economy, so long reliant on relations, will not necessarily respond in
desired ways to massive infusions of money. Aid to Russia is counter-
productive if it helps to prop up the virtual economy.
173
[A failing of prior aid efforts] lay in thinking that lasting institutions can be
built by supporting particular people, instead of helping to facilitate processes
and the rule of law. A system based primarily on personal connections and
handshakes did not foster the development of independent institutions that
could outlive their current executives.
174
While it is natural to want to assist those who want reform and to deny as-
sistance to those who oppose it, the final objective, irrespective of the
means, must be apolitical.
175
The West must be realistic about its role in Russia's transition to a
market economy. It cannot lead the transition. Rather it can only hope to
help Russians to lead it.176 The effort to lead reform rather than have Rus-
sians lead it enhances the credibility of anti-reform elements, notably the
communists, who are able to trumpet the absence of real benefits to Rus-
sians except for a select few.177 Reform is a slow process that occurs on
many fronts; it can not be instantaneous. The cultural aspects of reform
will take a long time to materialize. Aid packages from the West will not
"[exorcise] the legacies of communism itself."
178
172 Russia has "opened itself to Western ideas and influences to an astonishing degree."
Gumbel and Robbins, supra note 21.
173 There are tempting reasons to provide such aid: it provides stability, keeps the ruble
from depreciating, and prevents dislocations caused by many bankruptcies. See Gaddy &
Ickes, supra note 75, at 65-67.
174 See WEDEL, supra note 40, at 162.
175 See id. at 163 (1998):
To foster reform, donors need to work to develop a market infrastructure that all relevant
parties can support - not just one political faction. As one aid-paid consultant expressed
it: "One of the hardest parts of Western aid ... was figuring out how to build member-
owned, member-driven organizations that are neutral third parties and don't have a vested
interest in the success of one or several parties. ... The hardest thing to get people over is
political ties ... to get leaders of organizations to seek opinion and perform for people
who aren't political buddies."
176 The lesson: Russia is changing and becoming more familiar to Western eyes, but in its
own way, at its own pace. "One should avoid the hubris that foreigners can make much
of a difference anywhere," says Charles Blitzer, who until recently worked as the World
Bank's chief economist in Moscow. "All foreigners can do is support and help that proc-
ess. They can't direct or lead it."
Gumbel and Robbins, supra note 21.
177 See WEDEL, supra note 40, at 162 ("by promoting the ... Chubais clan, and excluding
other, less Westernized groups shaping Russian politics and economics, the U.S. aid estab-
lishment offended many Russians and fueled anti-Western sentiment").
178 See id. at 21 (distinguishing objectives of aid to Eastern Europe from aid given previ-
ously to Third World countries).
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This paper examines possible legal reforms that can assist in enhancing
the role of contract rather than relationships in the Russian economy. To be
a force for good, reformed laws must be enforced. The focus here is on
those laws that would have the greatest impact in arresting the vicious
downward spiral179 of the virtual economy. Hence, the focus will not be on
those laws whose lack of enforcement may receive the greatest publicity,
e.g., criminal laws. Rather the focus is on those laws that would most ef-
fectively address the very foundation of the virtual economy, i.e., the bank-
ruptcy laws and the "laws" pertaining to government interference and
subsidization of inefficient firms. And of course any argument for law re-
form is essentially addressed to Russians more than to anyone else.
Russian leaders should look for ways to encourage private investment
by identifying the ways in which they currently discourage it.180 One way
to discourage investment is to reward inefficient and non-viable firms at the
expense of efficient firms. Local governments have proved to be very adept
at implementing this type of perverse reward system. Instead of rewarding
the inefficient and non-viable, law in Russia should be a tool by which such
firms are removed from the competitive landscape. That occurs through en-
forcement of effective bankruptcy laws.
A. Bankruptcy and Restructuring
A capitalist market rewards only the most efficient suppliers. The inef-
ficient must exit a market and utilize resources in some other endeavor. In
this way, a nation realizes the greatest possible wealth, i.e., value.181 When
the inefficient (and unprofitable) do not exit, the system must force them to
do so. A legal system forces the inefficient to exit through bankruptcy. It is
said that "capitalism without bankruptcy is like Catholicism without sin." 
182
In Russia, at least two broad questions concerning bankruptcy arise.
The first is whether there are conditions that inhibit the working of any
bankruptcy law, no matter how well designed. Political policies may so fa-
vor the continued existence of insolvent enterprises that the best bankruptcy
laws in the world cannot foster efficiency. The second is whether the bank-
ruptcy law is itself efficient in either forcing inefficient enterprises out of
business or restructuring them so that they become efficient. The paper
now addresses these two questions in turn.
179 See Virtual Reality: Barter Is the Rule in Russia - and That Has a Price, supra note
85 ("Few circles could be more vicious").
180 Cf. Igor Semenenko, De Beers Abandons Diamond Project, Moscow TIMEs, May 17,
2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File (noting that legal and tax regimes in
need of reform).
181 Value is measured by willingness to pay or by willingness to sell.
8 2 BARRY EICHENGREEN, TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE
PRACTICAL POST-ASIA AGENDA 15 (1999) ("it is said;" evidently Professor Eichengreen
makes no claim of authorship).
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1. Inhibiting Bankruptcy and Restructuring
As this paper has noted, the Russian enterprises that emerged in priva-
tization were notoriously inefficient.183 Unfortunately, the political climate
has frequently seriously undermined the good that a bankruptcy law could
accomplish.
First, the political system has done little or nothing to remove the per-
sons inept at operating in a market economy, but who were nevertheless
given charge of enterprises. During privatization, these managers gained
economic power without responsibility to shareholders, to their enterprise,
or to the national economy. As one observer noted, such persons acquired
their ownership and managerial status through "'insolence, moral compro-
mise, abuse of. . .position within the country's power structures, and
crime."'1 84 Such talents are not particularly useful to operating in a market
economy.
Second, the Russian government has too often made available favors,
e.g., credits, that it dispensed on the basis of political connections. This of
course rewards the very managers whose obsolete skills should not be
equated with business acumen. It always was an article of faith that privat-
ized firms would need to be restructured, e.g., employee cutbacks, changes
in product lines, financial realignment-perhaps in joint ventures or with
foreign investment, and that there should be reductions in social spending
on employees.185 Even the best firms were not well-run.1 86 Privatized
firms must be de-politicized so that they can redirect their efforts from
seeking favors from politicians to marketing and sales.187 Unfortunately,
the fact that holdover managers had developed the skills in the Soviet so-
cialist economy of getting subsidies and acquiring supplies-not in mar-
keting and sales-does not convince them that they should cede power to
those with more relevant skills.1
88
Inept and unaccountable management of course discourages outside
investment, and managers and workers cannot provide any investment
capital. Without a wholesale purge of such management-and perhaps
their firms too-the downward spiral of the virtual economy cannot be bro-
ken. The twin objectives of bankruptcy in Russia should be the closing of
hopelessly inefficient finms and the pressuring of others to restructure in
more than a cosmetic way so as to become efficient and competitive on a
183 See BLAsi, KRoUMOVA & KRusE, supra note 6, at 178 (in 1996, 3/4 of all Russian
firms in need of "radical and far-reaching restructuring").
184 Puffer & McCarthy, supra note 28, at 1287-88 (quoting Konstantin Zuyev, Moscow
TIMES, July 23, 1995).
18 5 See BOYCKO, SHLEIFER & VISHNY, supra note 10, at 125.
186 See BRADY, supra note 23, at 141 ("Red Directors' enterprises were not working
well).
187 See BOYCKO, SHLEIFER & VIsHNY, supra note 10, at 126.
"' See id. at 129.
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global scale. Real restructuring is not "negative restructuring,"189 i.e., a
firm's coping with reduced demand for its output by cutting its workforce
by less than the reduction in output so that cost per unit actually in-
creases. 190 Such "negative restructuring" does not eliminate managerial re-
liance on government subsidies. 19 1 Governments must impose hard budget
constraints so that managers have a real incentive to engage in real restruc-
turing.192
Radical [i.e., real] restructuring involves serious changes in four areas: man-
agement and control, organization of the business, capital, and the social serv-
ices the enterprise provides for employees... [M]anagement leadership and
modernization through capital investment are the critical ingredients.1
93
"Current Russian managers may not have the heart for such far-reaching
changes."1
94
Bankruptcy should be the point at which the turn towards a rule-based
market economy is identifiable. This is because bankruptcy is the point at
which the inefficient are removed so that, given enough time, only accepta-
bly efficient firms 195 remain.
Bankruptcy provides an interesting prism through which the development of an
economy in transition can be gauged. First, it provides a test of fidelity to free-
market economics. If the nation has moved from central planning to a free
market system, it must be prepared to let businesses that are losing proposi-
tions fail rather than subsidize them in perpetuity. Second, it provides an inter-
esting test of the treatment of foreign investment, since bankruptcy creates an
acid test in which the claims of financial institutions, which predictably are
more likely to be secured in some fashion, will be weighed against the claims
of politically powerful groups, such as the work force, governmental entities
and local trade debt. By and large, CIS nations have been quick to address the
need for bankruptcy legislation-they have deliberated it in the context of new
civil codes and have passed several special laws. This legislation has, broadly
speaking, been pleasing to the foreign institutional patrons of the newly
189 See BLASi, KROUMOVA & KRUSE, supra note 6, at 132.
190 See Aron, supra note 22 (managerial response to reduced state orders not real re-
structuring, but lowered production, sale of inventory, profligate and reckless borrowing,
withholding taxes, accrual of enormous inter-enterprise debts).
191 See BLAsI, KROuMOVA & KRUSE, supra note 6, at 123.
192 See id. at 128.
193 See id. at 125 ("The restructuring of a corporation that was formerly controlled by a
ministry in Moscow involves more than cosmetic changes or general plans."); see also Ati-
yas, supra note 57, at 195 (necessary actions include "strengthening production, eliminating
non-viable units, introducing proper managerial practices, adopting new technologies, liqui-
dating unproductive assets, and eliminating excess staffing").194 See BLASi, KRoUMOvA & KRUSE, supra note 6, at 125.
195 This is not to say that all efficient firms will survive. But the damage done to the Rus-
sian economy by inefficient firms is so great that sweeping some efficient firms into the
purge of inefficient firms is worth the cost.
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emerging democracies. But the legislation has been remarkably underutil-
ized.
196
The paper now turns to an examination of Russia's recently enacted bank-
ruptcy law. Russia's willingness to invoke the new law demonstrates the
intensity of Russia's desire to move to a market economy.
2. Russia's New Law on Insolvency
Russia has a relatively new bankruptcy law, promulgated on January 8,
1998. This paper examines some of the features of the statute as they relate
to addressing the problems identified and offers comments.
Federal Law and Applicability: Russian bankruptcy law is federal
law.197 This of course has the advantage of making the applicability of the
bankruptcy law uniform. The new law's unitary procedure improves on
prior law which had several disparate bankruptcy procedures.1 98 The bank-
ruptcy law has broad application, i.e., to all commercial organizations ex-
cept for: public enterprises, non-commercial enterprises operating in the
form of a consumer cooperative, charitable foundations, or charitable
funds. 199 The law also applies to credit organizations 2 ° and individual citi-
zens.20 1 Foreign persons may participate in bankruptcy proceedings as
creditors.202 This should facilitate foreign direct investment-at least the
absence of such a right of participation will not inhibit foreign investment.
Fact of Insolvency: Insolvency is defined as a debtor's inability to sat-
isfy creditors' claims fully with respect to monetary obligations or to per-
form an obligation to make compulsory payments, i.e., taxes, dues, and
other mandatory contributions. 203 The law references "monetary" obliga-
tions. The manner in which the barter economy functions should hasten the
bankruptcy of those non-viable entities that do business extensively by
barter. The high valuations placed on items exchanged through barter is of
course unrealistic, but it has the effect of increasing the monetary obliga-
tions of debtors. Hopefully the political interference necessary to save such
enterprises will not be forthcoming.
196 See Dm-itry Pentsov, Glen Kolleeny & Scott Horton, Bankruptcy Kazak Style: The
Karmet Case, Russ. AND COMMONWEALTH Bus. L. REP., May 20, 1996, available at LEXIS,
News Library, RCBLR File.
197 See Federal Law # 6-FZ of January 8, 1998 on Insolvency, Art. 1(1). An English
translation of the law by Garant-Service is available at LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Rflaw file.
"9 ' See New RF Bankruptcy Law Workable but Flawed, Russ. AND COMMONWEALTH Bus.
L. REP., Feb. 11, 1998, available at LEXIS, News Library, RCBLR File.
199 See Federal Law # 6-FZ of January 8, 1998 on Insolvency, supra note 197, Art. 1(2).
200 See id. Art. 1(3).
201 See id. Art. 1(4).
202 See id. Art. 1(6).
203 See id. Art. 2.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 21:1 (2000)
Three months arrears at a time when the sum of a citizen debtor's obli-
gations exceed the value of his/her property indicates an inability to satisfy
creditors' claims with respect to monetary obligations or compulsory pay-
ments.20 4 Three months arrears in a legal entity's "monetary obligations" or
obligation to make compulsory payments indicates an inability to satisfy
creditors' claims.205 In the case of a legal entity, it is not necessary that the
value of obligations exceed the value of a debtor's assets--only that the
debtor not be meeting financial obligations as they come due. This pre-
cludes legal entities rich in relatively non-liquid assets-at least as per-
ceived by a judge whose impartiality may not necessarily be taken for
granted-who are unable to make payments to creditors to avoid bank-
ruptcy. 206 This is a definite improvement over the prior law that required
an analysis of the debtor's balance sheet,207 a process that could be both
lengthy and complicated.
20 8
Not counted in a determination of insolvency are "monetary obliga-
tions" to make payments to citizens for harm to life or health and obliga-
tions to pay copyright royalties as well as fines or penalties incurred for
non-performance or improper performance of a monetary obligation. 20 9 A
legal entity may not count in its determination of insolvency obligations to
the debtor's founders.210 These obligations do not disappear of course, but
debtors who owe such liabilities whose cash flow is not adequate to pay
such obligations avoid bankruptcy so long as they pay their other creditors.
The effect of this definition may be perverse. It impedes the bankruptcy of
those who have injured others, those who violate copyrights (e.g., pirates),
and corporate founders to whom the corporation owes money (and of
course the source of the obligation may be "obscure"). Such entities should
be put out of business, a consequence that is made more certain through
bankruptcy. Such claims can instead be made non-dischargeable.
Accelerated Bankruptcy Procedures: As an overlay to the external
management process, Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko decreed
204 See id. Art. 3(1).
205 See id. Art. 3(2).
206 See Katy Daigle, New Bankruptcy Law Updates Process, Moscow TIMES, Mar. 4,
1998, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostrns File (citing example of automaker Mo-
skvich whose dilapidated buildings and outdated equipment a court determined to be worth
more than its debts).207 See New RF Bankruptcy Law Workable But Flawed, supra note 198.
208 See Peter A. Maximov, Russia 'r New Bankruptcy Law Is a Step Forward, Russ. AND
COMMONWEALTH Bus. L. REP. Apr. 22, 1998, available at LEXIS, News Library, RCBLR
File; Laurence S. Moss, Bankruptcy Reform in Russia: The Case for Creditor Rights in Rus-
sia, REv. Aus. ECON. 121, 137 (2000) (court's task of valuation impossible when resale
market for assets non-existent).209 See Federal Law # 6-FZ of January 8, 1998 on Insolvency, supra note 197, Art. 4(2).
210 See id.
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"Accelerated Bankruptcy Procedures."2 11  Pursuant to this decree, the
debtor's creditors-especially those owed "compulsory payments," i.e., state
agencies-may consolidate their claims and be represented by the Federal
Service of Russia for Insolvency and Financial Rehabilitation (Service), an
agency of the Russian government.2 12 Such consolidation permits a group
of creditors to present a unified claim in creditors' proceedings. The Serv-
ice may propose a candidate for interim manager subject to approval of the
Arbitration Court.2 13 The Creditors' Committee-which includes the
Service as a member-may vote to proceed directly to receivership and use
of accelerated procedures.2 14 Under accelerated procedures and pursuant to
a receivership plan drawn up by an external manager, the debtor's business
is subject to reorganization including establishment of a new joint-stock
company that acquires the debtor's assets and retains the company's jobs.
Stock in the new company is sold, and proceeds from the sale are used to
pay the debtor's debts.2 15 But if proceeds from the sale of stock are insuffi-
cient to satisfy all creditors' claims, the arbitration manager files an appli-
cation with the Arbitration Court to terminate the receivership, rule the
debtor bankrupt, and open bankruptcy proceedings.
Accelerated Bankruptcy Procedures would seem useful in cases where
the debtor is solvent in the sense that it owns assets worth more than its li-
abilities but does not have sufficient cash flow to pay its bills. Accelerated
Bankruptcy Procedures accomplish little if the sale of stock in the newly
formed joint-stock company does not generate sufficient funds to pay off all
creditors, and new shareholders would contribute funds of that magnitude
only if the debtor's assets were greater in value than its liabilities. Such a
procedure might also facilitate removal of incompetent or dishonest man-
agement, as new shareholders should insist-as a condition of their making
capital contributions-on acquiring control of the corporation.
In fact, Prime Minister Kiriyenko viewed the Accelerated Bankruptcy
Procedures as a means of collecting from tax-dodging enterprises. 2 16 And
indeed the law's intent is to encourage existing firms to become more effi-
cient and competitive by facilitating the sale of inefficient firms to new
owners. 2 17 Georgy Tal, head of the Service, has taken a cautious approach
211 See Decision of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 476 of May 22, 1998
on Measures to Increase Efficiency of Applying Bankruptcy Procedures (on file with the
author).212 See id. § 3 (Regulations).
213 See id.
214 See id. § 4 (Regulations).
215 See id §§ 5-6 (Regulations).
216 See Kiriyenko Introduces Accelerated Bankruptcy Procedure, Russ. AND
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to use of Accelerated Bankruptcy Procedures, indicating that they should be
used only in exceptional cases and pursuant to government resolution.
218
Initiation of Bankruptcy Proceedings: Several different parties may
initiate a bankruptcy proceeding in an Arbitration Court.219 The Arbitration
court itself may initiate a bankruptcy proceeding if aggregate claims against
a legal entity debtor are 500 times the minimum wage rate or if aggregate
claims against a citizen are 100 times the minimum wage rate.220 In con-
nection with non-performance of monetary obligations, the debtor, credi-
tors, or the public prosecutor may initiate the proceeding.221 In connection
with non-performance of an obligation to make compulsory payments, the
debtor, the public prosecutor,222 the tax authorities, or other authorized
bodies 223 may initiate the proceeding.224 Federal law may authorize still
others to file an application for recognition of a debtor as bankrupt.2 25 In
the absence of creditors' objections, a legal entity may declare bankruptcy
and proceed with voluntary liquidation.226 Of course, the right of any
creditor to object may mitigate whatever effect this provision would have to
encourage legal entities to liquidate voluntarily.
Giving power to so many representatives of the public to seek the
bankruptcy of a debtor may have the salutary effect of breaking into the
downward spiral of the barter economy. The new bankruptcy law makes it
easier for an unpaid creditor to initiate a bankruptcy proceeding-a definite
improvement over prior law under which a court had to compare the size of
a debtor's assets and debts.227 The debtor's creditors may in fact have an
interest in keeping the insolvent debtor afloat as in the case of company
towns. The same is true of local and regional governments. In such cases,
neither the debtor nor the creditor may be inclined to initiate a bankruptcy
proceeding. A broader class of persons or entities who may initiate a claim
218 See Russia, Russ. AND COMMONWEALTH Bus. L. RE., Nov. 18, 1998, available at
LEXIS, News Library, RCBLR File.
219 An Arbitration Court examines bankruptcy cases. See Federal Law # 6-FZ of January
8, 1998 on Insolvency, supra note 197, Art. 5(1).
220 See id. Art. 5(2).
2' See id. Art. 6(1).
m The public prosecutor's power to file an application for recognition of a debtor as
bankrupt is limited to cases when he/she discovers indicia of deliberate bankruptcy, when the
debtor has debts with respect to compulsory payments, when the Russian Federation, a con-
stituent region of the Russian Federation, or a municipality is owed a monetary obligation,
and when otherwise authorized by federal law. See Federal Law # 6-FZ of January 8, 1998
on Insolvency, supra note 197, Art. 40(1).223 See id. at Article 32(2), which names the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation, the
Federal Obligatory Medical Insurance Fund of the Russian Federation, the Social Insurance
Fund of the Russian Federation, and the State Employment Fund of the Russian Federation.
224 See id. Art. 6(2).
25 See id. Art. 6(3).
226 See id. Art. 24.
227 See Maximov, supra note 208.
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makes it less likely that the recalcitrance of another creditor will allow the
insolvent entity to carry on. Public officials who are at least indirectly ac-
countable to the electorate at large and who represent entities that are them-
selves creditors, e.g., tax authorities, may be more inclined to initiate such
claims.
One unfortunate consequence of giving all creditors owed 500 times
the minimum wage the power to initiate bankruptcy proceedings is that
creditors owed small sums can initiate bankruptcy proceedings that either
impede restructuring or, even worse, allow inside managers/shareholders to
strip a business of its desirable assets. In the case of Moskvich, a creditor
was owed the equivalent of about $2000. The City of Moscow had earlier
taken a 59% stake in Moskvich in exchange for the City's pledge to assume
a remarkable $48,000,000 in tax debt. In two years, the company had in-
creased production from 3000 cars annually to 40,000; it had introduced
new models and entered a joint venture project with Renault. The creditor
obviously had something more in mind than collecting $2000. In fact, ob-
scure creditors owed small amounts often initiate the proceedings so that
shareholders who are also secured creditors can strip the company of desir-
able assets.228 Companies such as Moskvich, while insolvent, may hold
some very desirable assets, such as prime real estate.229 Such asset strip-
ping obviously injures many parties, especially other creditors who are de-
nied the means by which to collect on their debts. Asset stripping, if not
thievery, at least constitutes a preference.
Unfortunately, there is no middle ground between facilitating bank-
ruptcy by giving broad powers to initiate the proceeding and abuse that fa-
cilitates insider asset stripping. The statute addresses the abuse directly-
both "fictional" bankruptcies and preferences. The Russian statute imposes
several obligations on debtors and the managers of legal entities. The stat-
ute provides for personal liability of managers who fail in certain obliga-
tions or prefer some creditors to others. The statute also gives arbitration
courts the authority to order debtors to transfer property to third persons for
safekeeping in order to protect the interests of creditors.
The new bankruptcy law imposes an obligation upon debtors to file an
application for bankruptcy if satisfying the claim of one or more creditors
would make impossible performance of the debtor's monetary obligations to
other creditors 230 or if during liquidation of the debtor, the impossibility of
228 See Carol Matlack, Asset Disposal: Russia 's Boom in Bogus Bankruptcies, Bus. WK.
INT'L, (May 31, 1999), available in LEXIS, News Group File ("flood of dubious filings
against corporations and banks"); Sabrina Tavernese, Using Bankruptcy as a Takeover Tool,
N.Y. TwEs, Oct. 7,2000, at C1 ($5000 debts may topple firms worth millions).
29 See Sujata Rao, Moskvich Hit With Bankruptcy Suit, Moscow TIMES, Feb. 16, 1999,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File, (noting that similar proceedings had been
initiated against oil major Sidanko and against high-speed rail company VSM).
230 See Federal Law # 6-FZ of January 8, 1998 on Insolvency, supra note 197, Art. 8(1).
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fully satisfying creditors' claims is established.231 The debtor has only one
month in which to file such an application.232 A debtor's failure to meet
this obligation subjects a legal entity's executive members of the liquidation
commission to joint and several liability for obligations that arise after the
mandatory time for filing.233 Such persons may also lose the right to oc-
cupy management positions or to conduct business activities relating to the
management of legal entities.234 Individual executives and individual en-
trepreneurs are subject to criminal prosecution.235 This provision certainly
is intended to get insolvent debtors to initiate proceedings "voluntarily" as
soon as possible. If it has that effect, the provision would be a good one.
On the other hand, it may encourage executives to conceal the entity's state
of affairs, hardly a desirable outcome. The inertia of the barter economy-
with its tight relationships between local governments and debtors, and
between management and worker/shareholders-may be such that this pro-
vision will provide little incentive for debtors essentially to "turn them-
selves in." Moreover, individual responsibility is placed on those most
likely to engage in asset stripping. There is little evidence that this provi-
sion of the law has significantly increased the number of bankruptcy filings,
but at least the statute raises the stakes for those who abuse the bankruptcy
process.
The new law also imposes a duty upon founders or participants of a le-
gal entity debtor, the property owner of a debtor that is a unitary enterprise,
federal executive bodies, executive bodies of constituent regions of the
Russian Federation, and bodies of local self-government to take measures in
a timely manner to prevent the bankruptcy of the organization.236 This pro-
vision appears to address the type of management self-dealing that weakens
even a profitable corporation. In the case of founders or participants of a
legal entity debtor or the property owner of a debtor that is a unitary enter-
prise, the duty extends to taking measures directed to the financial recovery
of the debtor.237 Violation of this provision subjects one to liability ac-
cording to federal law.238  This provision appears to require man-
ager/shareholders to act in ways contrary to what they have always
perceived to be their own self-interest. They may not bilk corporations into
bankruptcy, but must affirnmatively take measures to assure their solvency.
On the other hand, creditors and founders of a legal entity may provide fi-
231 See id. Art. 8(2).
232 See id. Art. 8(3).
23 See id. Art. 9(1).
234 See id. Art. 9(2).
235 See id. Art. 9(3). Such persons face up to three years in jail. See Daigle, supra note
206.236 See id. Art. 26(1).
237 See id. Art. 26(2).
238 See id. Art. 26, last unnumbered paragraph.
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nancial assistance to the debtor within the framework of bankruptcy pre-
vention measures to restore the debtor to solvency.239 The debtor may then
assume an obligation to repay the one providing such assistance.240 That
obligation ranks no lower than the obligations owing to others who ex-
tended credit of the same sort. Unfortunately, this provision gives rights to
avoid bankruptcy to the very entities that will have an interest in preventing
it, i.e., local governments. And local governments have in fact extended
credit to legal entities that only prolonged the agony. This only reinforces
the destructively symbiotic relationship between inefficient firms and local
governments.
The new bankruptcy law very strictly addresses the so-called
"fictional" bankruptcy.241 A fictional bankruptcy is one in which the legal
entity debtor's founders, executives, or others take actions to send the firm
into bankruptcy, presumably to obtain the firm's assets-either as a creditor
or by hiding them.242 Such a person is subject to criminal prosecution
and/or disqualification from holding a similar position.243 The latter provi-
sions, if enforced, should preclude insiders from benefiting from a legal en-
tity's bankruptcy. Enforcement is of course the key.
These latter provisions may be invoked in the context of a bankruptcy
proceeding. In fact, they are provisions of corporate governance-impos-
ing ongoing obligations on managers of even solvent corporations.
In addition to addressing fictional bankruptcies and preferences, the
new bankruptcy law gives an arbitration court the power to secure creditors'
claims by ordering the debtor to transfer securities, currency, or other prop-
erty to a third party in order to conserve the debtor's property.244 From the
time of observation proceedings, an arbitration court may also remove the
debtor's executive if he/she does not take necessary measures to preserve
the debtor's property.245 Of course, the effectiveness of this measure will
depend upon the willingness of an arbitration court to use it at appropriate
times. An arbitration court should make such decisions without undue in-
fluence from interested parties.
Representation of Creditors' Interests: A creditors' "meeting" and a
creditors' "committee" represent the interests of all creditors during a bank-
ruptcy proceeding.246 During a bankruptcy proceeding, no creditor may
apply to the debtor for the purpose of seeking individual satisfaction of
239 See id. Art. 27(1).
240 See id. Art. 27(2).
241 See id. Art. 10.
242 See Daigle, supra note 206.
243 See Federal Law # 6-FZ of January 8, 1998 on Insolvency, supra note 197, Art. 10(3).
The potential penalty is six years in jail; see also Daigle, supra note 206.
24 See Federal Law # 6-FZ of January 8, 1998 on Insolvency, supra note 197, Art. 44(2).
24 See id. Art. 58(4).
246 See id. Art. 11(4).
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his/her claim.247 The "meeting" is comprised of creditors, tax authorities,
and other authorized bodies as regards compulsory payments.248 Members
of the creditors' "meeting" have votes in proportion to the "monetary obli-
gations" or "compulsory payments" owed to them.249 A majority of the
votes cast at a creditors' meeting is sufficient to adopt a decision, 250 but in-
stitution and extension of external management, petitioning the Arbitration
Court for recognition of the debtor as bankrupt, and application to the Ar-
bitration Court for removal of the arbitration manager require a majority of
the total number of votes of all competing creditors of the creditors'
"meeting."251 Creditors at a creditors' meeting may institute external man-
agement, conclude an amicable agreement, commence "competitive pro-
ceedings," i.e., the proceedings in which a determination is made
concerning the amount to be paid each creditor prior to liquidation, and
make decisions concerning the number of members and composition of the
creditors' committee and to appeal either of their actions to the Arbitration
Court.2 5 2
The distinction between votes proportional to monetary obligations or
compulsory payments owed and votes accorded each creditor equally is
significant. If a single creditor is owed much and has an interest in keeping
the debtor afloat, proportional voting allows that creditor to defeat the inter-
ests of other creditors as well as the public interest in pushing non-viable
firms out of business. This may be particularly likely when a local gov-
ernment is owed a substantial amount and has designated the debtor as one
with whom others should do business. If voting is "one-creditor, one-vote,"
the power of such entities is of course diluted while the power of those with
much less at stake is enlarged (and distorted). Moreover, debtor satisfaction
of creditors through preferential payments (or satisfaction of debts by third
parties (see discussion of Sidanko infra)) has the consequence of reducing
or eliminating the influence of that creditor; the voting system in effect de-
termines whether this can be done cheaply. It is possible to adopt a combi-
nation of both cumulative voting and "one-creditor, one-vote" systems, e.g.,
51% of the claims and 1/3 of all of the creditors.
The creditors' meeting elects by cumulative voting2 53 the members of
the creditors' committee who serve during the period of external manage-
247 See id. Art. 11 (4).
248 See id. Art. 12(1).
249 See id. Art. 12(3).
250 See id. Art. 14(1).
251 See id. Art. 14(2). If such a majority cannot be obtained, a second creditors' meeting
may be called to deal with such matters, and a majority of votes present at the second meet-
ing is sufficient if adequate notice was provided. See id. Art. 14(3).
252 See id. Art. 12(2).
253 See id. Art. 17(2). A creditor with respect to monetary obligations or compulsory
payments equal to ten times the legal minimum wage is entitled to the number of votes of the
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ment and competitive proceedings.254 The creditors' meeting may also re-
voke the powers of the entire creditors' committee.255 The creditors' com-
mittee is comprised of no more than eleven persons2 56 who may elect their
own chairman if there are fewer than six members and must elect a chair-
man if there are six or more members.257 It represents the interests of com-
peting creditors and monitors the actions of the external manager.258 If
there are fewer than fifty competing creditors, the creditors' meeting may
decide to assume the functions of the creditors' committee.259 The credi-
tors' committee may adopt a decision by a majority of votes of the total
number of members of the creditors' committee.260 The creditors' commit-
tee may require the external manager or the competitive proceedings man-
ager to provide information about their progress. 261 Important day-to-day
oversight is entrusted to the creditors' committee. That committee is se-
lected by cumulative voting, but the committee acts on a one-committee-
member-one-vote basis. Thus the possibility of a dominant creditor with
interests in preserving a non-viable firm controlling the identity of com-
mittee members exists--even though the committee itself theoretically is
not subject to such dominance.
The Bankruptcy Proceeding- The Arbitration Court for the location of
the legal entity debtor and the residence of its citizens has jurisdiction over
the bankruptcy proceedings involving that legal entity.262 To the extent that
the local government controls the members of the Arbitration Court, this
may be unfortunate in that such members become beholden to the parties
most interested in keeping non-viable firms afloat at the expense of firms
that are more efficient. A representative of the debtor's employees is a
party to a bankruptcy case.
263
The Russian Bankruptcy Act contemplates three stages264 of a bank-
ruptcy case265-any one of which may be the last: observation proceedings,
external management, and competitive proceedings. Hopefully the ap-
pointment of managers will reduce the incidence of company theft, i.e.,
committee members to be elected. Evidently the votes of all such creditors are equal in
weight.
25 See id. Art. 17(1).
25 See id. Art. 17(1).
256 See id. Art. 16(4).
257 See id. Art. 17(3).
25 See id. Art. 16(1).
2'9 See id. Art. 16(2).
260 See id. Art. 16(5).
261 See id. Art. 16(3).
262 See id. Art. 29(1).
263 See id. Art. 30.
26 Id. Art. 23 (plus amicable agreement).
265 See id. Article 2 actually names a fourth procedure, pre-trial rehabilitation, which in-
volves measures taken to prevent bankruptcy.
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shareholder-managers stealing of assets prior to losing control of the busi-
ness.26
6
First, there is the appointment of an interim manager267 who oversees
"observation proceedings." The interim manager's functions are to:
* Monitor all of the debtor's transactions (although the debtor remains
in control of its business);
• Conduct a financial analysis of the debtor company and look for signs
of premeditated bankruptcy;
* Compile a list of creditors and give them notice of the bankruptcy
proceeding;
" Arrange a meeting of creditors at which creditors decide whether to
call for appointment of an outside manager, recommend liquidation,
or work out an amicable agreement;
* Form and protect the bankruptcy estate for which he/she may forbid
the debtor from conducting any transactions and go to court to void
them as well as order the transfer of the debtor's property to a third
party for safe-keeping; and
* Approve (without court approval) major deals undertaken by the
debtor.268
During observation proceedings, the debtor's payments are suspended ex-
cept for court ordered payments of wages, royalties under copyright as-
signments, alimony, or compensation for harm to life and health or "moral"
damages-such orders having entered effect prior to the Arbitration Court's
acceptance of the application to recognize the debtor as bankrupt.269 Pay-
ments should not worsen the financial position of the debtor.270 The in-
terim manager serves only until the Arbitration Court declares the debtor
bankrupt and institutes "competitive proceedings" under the auspices of a
competitive proceedings manager, the creditors institute "external manage-
ment," the Arbitration Court approves an "amicable agreement," or the Ar-
bitration Court issues its order refusing to recognize the debtor as
bankrupt.271 At the same time, observation proceedings terminate.
272
Only if the debtor has assets sufficient to pay court costs and the ex-
penses of arbitration managers or one or more creditors can identify re-
sources to pay such costs will the Arbitration Court proceed to appoint an
"external manager"273 for a specified period of time. This initiates the sec-
266 See Daigle, supra note 206, quoting Yevgeny Fainshmidt.
2 67 See Federal Law # 6-FZ of January 8, 1998 on Insolvency, supra note 197, Art. 59(l).
268 See New RF Bankruptcy Law Workable but Flawed, supra note 198.
2 69 See Federal Law # 6-FZ of January 8, 1998 on Insolvency, supra note 197, Art. 57(1).
270 See Maximov, supra note 208.
271 See Federal Law # 6-FZ of January 8, 1998 on Insolvency, supra note 197, Art. 59(2).
272 See id. Art. 67(4).
273 See id. Art. 62(2).
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ond stage of the bankruptcy case. Selection of the external manager is by
majority vote of creditors.2 74 Even if creditors apply for competitive pro-
ceedings, the Arbitration Court may order external management if it be-
lieves that the creditors' application will harm the majority of creditors
and/or that there is a realistic opportunity to restore the debtor to sol-
vency.2 75 Thus the Arbitration Court may ostensibly act in the interest of
creditors who see their own interests differently from the way the Arbitra-
tion Court sees them. This seems to be an opportunity for the Arbitration
Court to delay the liquidation of non-viable entities for the benefit of a few
(maybe only one) large creditor at the expense of all of the other creditors.
The Arbitration Court may also be more heavy-handed in discriminating
against the interests of western creditors or management, seemingly a
problem in the Sidanko matter, infra.
The functions of the external manager are to take control of the enter-
prise from the debtor and run it, void transactions, and proceed to liquida-
tion if he/she cannot make the enterprise profitable within twelve to
eighteen months. 276 The court may void transactions that are "detrimental"
to creditors. This is an improvement over prior law which allowed for
voiding only "sham" transactions, i.e., those transactions that favored one
creditor over another.
External management is to last no more than twelve months, unless
extended for no more than six months (unless otherwise provided by the
Bankruptcy Act).277 The external manager essentially runs the business of
the debtor.278 As was the case during observation proceedings, during the
period of external management, the debtor's payments are suspended except
for court ordered payments of wages, royalties under copyright assign-
ments, alimony, or compensation for harm to life and health or "moral"
damages-such orders having entered effect prior to the Arbitration Court's
acceptance of the application to recognize the debtor as bankrupt.279 The
moratorium on payments extends to imposition of fines and penalties for
nonpayment of a debt that exceed the level established by § 395 of the Rus-
sian Federation Civil Code which happens to be the interest rate established
by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.280 This is an improvement
274 See id. Art. 71(3).
275 See id. Art. 67(4).
276 See New RF Bankruptcy Law Workable but Flawed, supra note 198.
277 See Federal Law # 6-FZ of January 8, 1998 on Insolvency, supra note 197, Art. 68(4),
Article 68(5) (period may be less than twelve months).
271 See id. Art. 69.
279 See id. Art. 70(2).
280 See Civil Code of the RSFSR, § 395 (adopted by Supreme Soviet of RSFSR, June 11,
1964, amended Nov. 30, 1994, amended Jan. 26, 1996). Section 395 gives citizens the right
to keep their money in state savings banks and other credit institutions and to receive inter-
est.
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over prior law under which such fines and penalties could render futile re-
structuring efforts. 281 The external manager has the power essentially to
reorganize the debtor, including the power to refuse to perform the debtor's
contracts282 if performance would cause loss to the debtor283 and the power
to dispose of the debtor's property-with the consent of the creditors'
meeting or the creditors' committee if the disposition is a "major" transac-
tion.284 The debtor's contractual counterpart may demand compensation for
refusal to perform the contract. 285 The external manager may petition the
Arbitration Court to cut off the rights of "interested persons," a phrase that
includes the debtor's executive body and various officers,286 as well to cut
off the rights of any other person 287 that arise out of transactions with the
debtor during the six-month period prior to the date the application for rec-
ognition of the debtor as bankrupt is submitted to the court.288 Thus the
external manager has the authority at this (rather late) point to stop insider
management dealing. The external manager must prepare a plan for re-
storing the debtor to solvency that the creditors' meeting passes upon.
289
The external management plan may provide for the sale of the enter-
prise, in which case the debtor's monetary obligations and compulsory
payments do not pass to the purchaser,290 but all labor agreements must re-
main in force, and the rights and obligations of the employer do pass to the
purchaser of the enterprise.291 This provision of course reflects the Rus-
sians' obsession with the prospect of unemployment. This provision will
inhibit the sale of some insolvent enterprises-although to what extent is
not knowable.
External management ends when the debtor is bankrupt and it is neces-
sary to proceed to a competitive proceeding, there is an amicable agree-
ment, or there is a declaration that the debtor has been restored to
solvency.292 However, the external manager may continue to perform du-
ties to assure a smooth transition.
293
281 See Maximov, supra note 208.
282 See Federal Law # 6-FZ of January 8, 1998 on Insolvency, supra note 197, Art. 74(1).
283 See id. Art. 77(2).
284See id. Art. 76 ("major" transactions include those involving property with a value
equal to 20% of the book value of the debtor's assets).
285 See id. Art. 77(3).
2
16 See id. Art. 18(1).
287 See id. Art. 78(3).
288 See id. Art. 78(2), Article 78(4) (participant of the debtor).
n9 See id. Arts. 82 and 83.
290 See id. Art. 86(1).
291 See id. Art. 86(2).
292 See id. Art. 96.
293 See id. Art. 96.
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Either observation proceedings or external management can end with
an "amicable agreement." An amicable agreement requires a majority vote
of all creditors, a unanimous vote of creditors whose claims are secured by
a pledge of the debtor's property, and the agreement of the debtor.294 An
amicable agreement is only available if first and second priority creditors'
claims are settled.295 Under prior law, an amicable agreement required a
two thirds vote of creditors and the debtor's payment of 35% of outstanding
debt within two weeks.296 The new law should facilitate the amicable
agreement more than the prior law. Creditors whose debts are secured by a
pledge of the debtor's property have third priority claims-after claims for
harm to life or health, wages of persons working under a labor agreement,
and royalties under copyright agreements.297 An amicable agreement can-
not discriminate among creditors of the same level of priority.298 An ami-
cable agreement is invalid if it provides preferences for specific
creditors. 299 A preferred creditor has an obligation to return anything re-
ceived in the course of performance of an invalid amicable agreement.3°°
The third stage of a bankruptcy proceeding under the Russian law is
"competitive proceedings." "Competitive proceedings" is the procedure
whereby creditors' claims against a debtor recognized as bankrupt are satis-
fied proportionately. 30 ' The procedure is to last one year, but the Arbitra-
tion Court may extend the period by six months and beyond.30 2 The
Arbitration Court appoints one or more "competitive proceedings manag-
ers."303 The statute gives competitive proceedings manager(s) sufficient
powers and responsibilities to manage the orderly liquidation of the bank-
rupt's estate.3°4 This includes the obligation to notify the debtor's employ-
ees of forthcoming dismissals in accordance with national labor
legislation 305 and the power to retrieve the debtor's property from those
who may possess it as the result of invalid transactions.30 6 The statute re-
quires removal from the bankrupts estate of the social housing fund, chil-
294 See id. Art. 120(2).
295 See id. Art. 123(1); see also id. Art. 125(1) (arbitration court to refuse approval of
amicable agreement in event of failure to satisfy first and second priority creditors).
m See Workouts May Become More Frequent in Russia, Russ. AND COMMONWEALTH
Bus. L. REP., Feb. 10, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, RCBLR File.
297 See Federal Law # 6-FZ of January 8, 1998 on Insolvency, supra note 197, Art.
125(1).
291 See id. Art. 122(3).
29 See id. Art. 127.
'0o See id. Art. 128(5).
"01 See id. Art. 2.
302 See id. Art. 97(2).
303 See id. Arts. 99(1) and (2).
3
04 See id. Art. 101.
305 See id. Art. 101(3).
106 See id. Art. 101(4).
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dren's pre-school institutions, and other facilities of public infrastructure
and their assignment to an authorized local government. 30 7 The competi-
tive proceedings manager(s) must make the assignment without conditions,
and the existing budgets remain sources of financing for the support of such
facilities.308 Local government officials must accept the obligation of
maintaining such facilities or face administrative or other liability.309 These
provisions are good in that they get social safety net provisions out of the
hands of debtors-but bad in the sense that the responsibility is passed to
another entity not necessarily capable of handling it, yet often capable of
inhibiting the very bankruptcy that makes such a transfer necessary. To that
extent, the local government has a considerable incentive to perpetuate non-
viable enterprises that will continue to assume such obligations, especially
in company towns. Moreover, the content of the safety net seems not to
matter-and it is likely that the safety net is much broader than local gov-
ernments can responsibly handle.
The Bankruptcy Law requires that court costs, expenses associated
with remuneration of the arbitration manager, and creditors' claims arising
during observation proceedings, external management or competitive pro-
ceedings be paid first.310 The Bankruptcy Law establishes the following
subsequent priorities: first, claims for liability for harm to life or health;
311
second, severance and wages of persons working under a labor agreement
and payment of copyright royalties; third, obligations secured by a pledge
of the debtor's property; fourth, compulsory payments to the budget and to
extra-budgetary funds; and fifth, payments to other creditors.312 Notice that
"secured" creditors are merely another class of creditors albeit a preferred
class. This likely will inhibit commercial creditors from loaning money to
any but the most credit-worthy of debtors. Moreover, the secured debt is
what is important, not the property securing the debt. A secured creditor
does not recover the collateral securing the debt. A secured creditor's third
priority claim exists only to the extent of the debt actually secured by a
pledge,313 but the extent of that debt may be satisfied both from the prop-
erty securing the debt and from other property not the subject of the
pledge.314 This is not sufficient protection to encourage credit transactions.
Insiders' secured claims are not preferred over compulsory payments or
payments to other creditors.315 This difference in priority for secured
307 See id. Art. 104(4).
308 See id. Art. 104(5).
309 See id. Art. 104(6).
310 See id. Art. 106(1).
31 See id. Art 106(2). Periodic payments are to be capitalized. See id. Art. 107.
312 See id. Art. 106(2).
313 See id. Art. 109(1).
314 See id. Art. 109(3).
315 See id. Art. 111(1).
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claims between a firm's founders and other creditors is of course appropri-
ate in that it treats the founders' interests more like equity and might make
asset stripping less likely. Creditors' unsatisfied claims resulting from in-
sufficient debtor's assets are discharged.316 It is here that the bankruptcy
law should reflect the policy of favoring the actual payment of obligations:
arising from harm to citizens' life or health, to pay copyright royalties, and
to pay fines or penalties incurred for non-performance or improper per-
formance of a monetary obligation. Such obligations should be non-
dischargeable. Such non-dischargeability might have the effect, say, of
causing potential creditors to avoid making loans to those who pirate copy-
righted compact disks.
Town-Forming Organizations: Some special procedures must be ob-
served in the case of so-called "town-forming organizations," i.e., a legal
entity whose employees plus their family members comprise half the
population of a populated locality or an organization that employs more
than 5000 people. 317 When a "town-forming organization" is the debtor, the
body of local self-government becomes a party to the case318 and may peti-
tion the Arbitration Court to institute external management. 319 Institution
of external management of course prolongs the process of bankruptcy, even
for those debtors who clearly are insolvent. If the Russian Federation, a
constituent region of the Russian Federation, or a municipality guarantees
the debtor's obligations, that party may propose a candidate to the Arbitra-
tion Court to be the external manager,320 but also becomes jointly and sev-
erally liable for the debtor's obligations. 321  To the extent that the
Arbitration Court accedes to the wishes of such a government body, the
likelihood of appointment of a candidate receptive to prolonging the exis-
tence of the debtor increases. Such external management may be extended
by the Arbitration Court for up to ten years322 at the petition of the body of
local self-government or an appropriate federal executive body or the ex-
ecutive of a constituent region of the Russian Federation, provided that the
debtor and its guarantor begin settlements with creditors within one year.323
A financial recovery plan for a town-forming organization may be the basis
of extending the period of external management.324 The Russian Federa-
tion, a constituent region of the Russian Federation, or a municipality has
the right before the end of external management of the "town-forming" or-
316 See id. Art. 114(5).
317 See id. Art. 132.
318 See id. Art. 133(l).
319 See id. Art. 134(1).
320 See id. Art. 134(2).
321 See id. Art. 134(3).
'22 See id. Art. 135(3).
323 See id. Art. 135(1).
324 See id. Art. 135(2).
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ganization to settle with all creditors in any manner provided by Federal
law.325 The "town-forming" organization may be sold in the course of ex-
ternal management proceedings at the petition of the executive body of a
constituent region of the Russian Federation, an appropriate federal execu-
five body, or a body of local self-government 32 6 for the purpose of satisfy-
ing creditors' claims,327 but only upon certain mandatory conditions:
preservation of at least 70% of employees' jobs, retraining employees if the
enterprise's activity changes, and other terms and conditions established
with the consent of the creditors' meeting.328 Certainly these conditions
will inhibit such sales. Otherwise the debtor's enterprise is subject to sale at
auction.329 Moreover, the arbitration manager must offer the enterprise for
sale as a single property complex in the first round of tenders. 330 The
"town-forming" provisions of the statute virtually guarantee that any local
government can (try to) keep a non-viable firm in business for at least ten
years. These provisions may prove disastrous to the development of a mar-
ket economy that rewards only efficient producers.
The "town-forming" provisions are intended to prevent high profile
bankruptcies of entities descended from Soviet era enterprises; a domino ef-
fect emanating from such bankruptcies causes concern.33 1 Such provisions
are nevertheless very counter-productive. They greatly inhibit change-and
rigid aversion to change results in more and more stagnation, thereby per-
petuating the downward economic spiral. Not only are inefficient firms
kept afloat-it is the large inefficient firms that are kept afloat. This of
course occurs at the expense of more nimble, smaller, and efficient enter-
prises.
Other Provisions: The bankruptcy statute contains provisions that gov-
ern specific industries, notably agricultural organizations, 332 credit organi-
zations, 33 3 insurance organizations, 334 and professional participants in
securities markets.335 As such entities are not notoriously a part of Russia's
virtual economy-at least not as described herein, this article omits any dis-
315 See id. Art. 136(l).
326 See id. Art. 137(2).
327 See id. Art. 137(1).
328 See id. Art. 137(3).
329 See id. Art. 137(4).
330 See id. Art. 138(1).
331 See New RF Bankruptcy Law Workable but Flawed, supra note 198.
332 See Federal Law # 6-FZ of January 8, 1998 on Insolvency, supra note 197, Arts. 139-
40.333 See id. Arts. 141-43. Bankruptcy of credit institutions is now governed by Federal
Law # 40-FZ of February 26, 1999.
334 See Federal Law # 6-FZ of January 8, 1998 on Insolvency, supra note 197, Arts. 144-
47.
335 See id. Arts. 148-51.
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cussion of those provisions. Moreover, neither are citizens, 336 individual
entrepreneurs, 337 or peasant enterprises 338 a significant part of the down-
ward spiral of the barter economy.
Comment: It is difficult to overstate the importance of an effective
bankruptcy law in Russia. One commentator noted that an effective bank-
ruptcy law is probably-as important to the Russian economy as privatization
itself.339 A bad bankruptcy law-or a good bankruptcy law that is badly
administered 340-inhibits activities such as lending and investing, the very
activities that stimulate economic activity and growth. Capital infusions
should only be available to restructure viable companies.
Even if a provision is aimed at curbing an obvious abuse, it will not
necessarily work as well as intended. Fine-tuning341 the criminal liability
of greedy manager/shareholders will accomplish little if those provisions
are not enforced. Of course it is good that such provisions are present. But
more effective might be giving real and significant powers to shareholders
to bring shareholder derivative suits before judges sophisticated enough to
honor shareholder rights.342 There is considerable room for improvement
in bankruptcy as the legal system processed only about 2000 bankruptcies
per year under the prior law.343 Nearly half of the businesses in Russia may
qualify for bankruptcy.344 Of course a real threat of bankruptcy would
prompt many businesses to pay bills so as to avoid bankruptcy. Unfortu-
nately, the "town-forming organization" provisions seem designed to per-
petuate for up to ten years inefficient firms. Realistically, the ten-year
limitation seems so long that it is not really a limitation at all.
In the context of its request for financial support from the International
Monetary Fund, the Russian government said the following:
336 See id. Arts. 152-63.
337 See id. Arts. 164-66.
33
1 See id. arts. 167-73.
339 See New RF Bankruptcy Law Workable but Flawed, supra note 198 (quoting Tom
Cumming).
340 Cf. Matlack, supra note 228 (noting unscrupulous judges and external managers who
ignore the will of creditors).
341 In this case, "fine-tuning" is akin to "throwing the book at."
342 Professors Black and Kraakman suggested a "self-enforcing" model as the appropriate
approach to Russian corporate law that does not depend upon courts but rather upon incen-
tives for voluntary compliance with laws that protect the interests of outside investors and
minority block-holders. See Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model
of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1911 (1996).343 See New RF Bankruptcy Law Workable but Flawed, supra note 198. The actual num-
bers were 9 in 1993, 300 in 1994, 1108 in 1995, 2700 in 1996, and 4600 in 1997. See Dai-
gle, supra note 206.
344 See Daigle, supra note 206, citing Yevgeny Fainshmidt (of 2.5 million businesses in
Russia, 800,000 defunct and 400,000 more qualify for bankruptcy).
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53. The existence of an adequate bankruptcy law and the ability to em-
ploy it when necessary is perhaps the fundamental element underlying the en-
forcement of hard budget constraints. To enhance the efficacy of the
bankruptcy process, the government has confirmed its commitment to make
full use of such procedures and, to this effect, will rescind the government di-
rective of January 27, 1999, to cease initiating bankruptcy proceedings against
tax debtors. Further, except for the banking sector, the government will refrain
from submitting to the State Duma draft laws which envisage special bank-
ruptcy terms for any type of debtor, and will ensure the independent status of
the Federal Insolvency and Financial Rehabilitation Service ("FIFRS") and
take measures to complete its staffing.
54. To address shortcomings of the current Law on Insolvency (Bank-
ruptcy), the government has submitted to the Duma with a view to ensuring
passage by October 31, 1999, of amendments to eliminate the bias in the law
towards reorganization rather than liquidation of enterprises, eliminate court
discretion in overruling the creditors' decision to liquidate the debtor enter-
prise; and provide for the participation of the state in bankruptcy proceedings
at all stages where relevant for the protection of the public interest. The
amendments will also provide a legislative basis for creditors to utilize bank-
ruptcy procedures in a special accelerated manner, including faster introduc-
tion of external management of enterprises under bankruptcy. Finally, to
enhance the incentive of managers to maintain solvency of their enterprises
and to abide by the Law on Insolvency, the government will submit to the State
Duma, by November 30, 1999, a draft law providing for increased personal fi-
nancial liability and management disqualification for improper conduct by
management resulting in the insolvency of enterprises managed by them.
345
No amendments to Russia's bankruptcy laws have been forthcoming.
346
The bankruptcy law contemplates that the Interim Manager and the External
Manager will draft and implement rehabilitation plans, with ample if not
generous time constraints. The town-forming provisions, which deal with
only the larger firms and hence the finns that can be the greatest drag on the
economy allow up to ten years for restructuring. This may turn out to be
essentially a meaningless provision that will have no effect in that economic
realities will overtake such firms long before the expiration of ten years.
34. Statement of the Government of the Russian Federation and Central Bank of Russia
on Economic Policies, July 13, 1999, at http://www.imf.orglextemal/np/loi/l1999/ 071399.ht
m.
346 This is not entirely accurate. In spring 2000, President Putin vetoed a bill that the
Duma and Federal Council had approved that would have, among other things, lengthened
receiverships to 21/2 years, lengthened the definition of insolvency of an enterprise to six
month arrears, and required that an enterprise's accounts payable equal five times the mini-
mum wage rate. In chronological order, see Interfax News Agency, Duma Amends Bank-
ruptcy Law, Feb. 29, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Interfax Russian News;
Laws, ZVEZDA, Mar. 1, 2000; Interfax News Agency, Duma S Property Committee Against
Changes in Bankruptcy Law, Mar. 21, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Interfax
Russian News; Interfax News Agency, Putin Rejects Parliament-Approved Bankruptcy Law
Changes, Apr. 25, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Interfax Russian News.
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Such firms will either collapse under the weight of their debt and misman-
agement or their assets will be picked clean by smaller, more nimble, and
efficient enterprises. 347 In the United States, barter is not the means by
which insolvent firms may continue to languish. Restructuring under
Chapter XI occurs when a firm's vital signs are not as desperate as those
same signs are for a firm that must resort to barter and tax arrears to con-
tinue its existence. Therefore, the bankruptcy law of Russia as enforced
should have a greater bias towards liquidation than toward restructuring and
rehabilitation than, say, the counterpart laws of the United States.
B. Legal Environment and the Depoliticization of Business
Russia is not a country lacking in abundant natural resources or a ca-
pable labor pool. Nevertheless, it remains an emerging economy. A major
cause of this has been Russia's governments-local and national. The rea-
son poor countries fail to acquire wealth lies "in the way poor countries are
governed, rather than in their natural disadvantages or in unfair treatment by
the rich."348 Russia's governments-local and national-have contributed
significantly to the country's economic stagnation,349 as has been indicated
throughout. The inequality of economic opportunity 350 caused by unequal
access to government favors and handouts is a political problem, not an
economic problem.
3 51
Industrial restructuring... requires policy and institutional actions on many
fronts. These actions include eliminating state protection in order to strengthen
enterprises; enhancing the mobility of labor and capital; and increasing the
availability of resources such as information, skills, and fimance.
352
347 Cf Feifer, supra note 12 (noting City of Moscow's massive allocations of money to
Moskvich and ZiL automakers who have no restructuring plan and no real hope for survival;
Renault now uses a section of Moskvich's plant to produce its cars with no further participa-
tion by Moskvich).
34S Special Section, Freedom 1 Journey: A Survey of the 20 h Century, "Free to Be Poor,"
ECONOMIST, Sept. 11, 1999, at 27, 28 (table shows Russia ranks 84 th out of 121 countries for
economic freedom - behind such countries as Haiti, Namibia, Bulgaria, and Uganda); see
also Akin, supra note 171 (according to "Transition Report 1999," the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, Russia had fourth worst governance rating).
349 An old adage says that, "The only economics in Russia is politics." Gary Peach, The
Analyst: Aksyonenko Railroads Russia s Magnificent Seven, Moscow TIMEs, Nov. 23, 1999,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File; cf Feifer, supra note 12 (describing politi-
cal considerations that prompt City of Moscow to keep two hopeless automakers, Moskvich
and ZiL, afloat).350 See Akin, supra note 171 ("Russia's Gini coefficient - a standard measure of inequal-
ity - grew faster than almost every other country in the former Soviet bloc").
351 See Peter Henderson, Politics Seen at Fault for Weak Economy, Moscow TIMES, Sept.
22, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File, quoting Michael Obermayer.352 See Atiyas, supra note 57, at 195.
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Russia's governments must improve the legal environment of the country
and depoliticize business. 3
53
In theory, ownership and control of a corporation resides with the cor-
poration's shareholders. When ownership of the corporation is diffuse, i.e.,
there are many shareholders with no one of them holding a sufficient num-
ber of shares to exercise control alone, a takeover (or threat of a takeover) is
the ultimate form of control over bad corporate management. In the ab-
sence of a takeover, corporate reorganization or bankruptcy then operates to
check mismanagement. In some countries, e.g., Germany and Japan, banks'
investments have made them the focal point of control over corporate man-
agement. 354 And in some countries, the state has assumed a significant role
in checking corporate mismanagement.
It would seem that a market-based system of control would achieve the
most appropriate, i.e., efficient, level of corporate control. This would be
control through stock ownership that could be transferred to other owners.
Transfers of takeover magnitude become attractive when for whatever rea-
son, including and especially mismanagement of the corporation, the value
of the corporation's shares sinks to levels that make purchase of a sufficient
number of shares to effectuate a takeover inexpensive relative to the value
of competing investments.
In Russia, neither banks nor the state have thus far shown the inclina-
tion to check mismanagement of many of the country's privatized firms.
Emergence of financial industrial groups ("FIGSs") in the loan-for-shares
programs did not spur banks to invest wisely and control mismanage-
ment.355 Moreover, some characteristics of many firms that this article has
identified include non-viability, insufficient capital, a small and identifiable
group of shareholders (i.e., employees and managers), shareholders whose
353 Black, Kraakman, and Tarassova identify
three main failures in the Russian privatization effort. First, mass privatization of large
enterprises is likely to lead to massive self-dealing unless.. .a country has a good infra-
structure for controlling self-dealing...
Second, the profit incentives to restructure privatized enterprises (instead of looting
them), and to create new businesses that could draw workers from shrinking enterprises
can be swamped by a hostile business environment. In Russia, that environment includes
a punitive tax system, official corruption, organized crime, an unfriendly bureaucracy,
and a business culture in which skirting the law is seen as normal, even necessary be-
havior...
Third, corrupt privatization of large firms can compromise future reforms.. .in a vicious
circle, dirty privatization.. .reinforces corruption and organized crime, as the new owners
turn their wealth to the task of buying judges and government officials.. .[T]he public
comes to see privatization (and, by inference, other market reforms) as connected with
self-dealing, corruption, and organized crime.
Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman, and Anna Tarassova, Russian Privatization and Corpo-
rate Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1731, 1734-35 (2000).
354 See Atiyas, supra note 57, at 198 (noting that institutions for controlling corporate
management include stock market, banks, and the state).
355 See Virtual Reality: Barter Is the Rule in Russia - and That Has a Price, supra note
85 (banks themselves were mismanaged).
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interest is not necessarily profit maximization but job preservation, and an
attitude of management that a firm is its private fief. Firms with this profile
are most unlikely to be desirable takeover targets. Takeover of a firm
would only occur if the raider believes that it can reap significant profits
through better management and reorganization. The description of many
Russian firms is such that no one perceives a diamond in the rough.
Control of corporate management of Russian corporations will arrive
when government(s) allow the competitive playing field to be level and al-
low the market to discipline the inefficient and worse. Specifically, re-
structuring and bankruptcy---or the threat of restructuring and bankruptcy-
will be the mechanisms that initially check management abuses.
The Russian government must stop extending loans, credits, and subsi-
dies based on political considerations. 356 It is far from certain that compa-
nies that lose the benefit of government loans, credits, subsidies, and/or
contracts will not be responsive. Rostelmash, a giant holdover from Soviet
times that manufactures combines, has responded to the drying up of gov-
ernment handouts by restructuring-which has included unloading some
unprofitable enterprises and formation of fourteen "daughter" companies,
i.e., subsidiaries. 357 Private investment will only occur if investors have
some measure of control over a firm,35 8 so firms must be made to be re-
sponsive to profit maximization, not political wishes.
Shares must be transferred to shareholders who are concerned with
profit maximization. Corporate managers must be made responsive to such
shareholder wishes.359 And even the transfer of shares to persons who care
more about profits than the personal aggrandizement of current manage-
ment will only occur if firms are viable. Potential investors would no doubt
judge many unrestructured single-plant corporations as not viable. Rather
than intervene in the market to preserve such firms at the expense of effi-
cient firms, government agencies, e.g., the central bank or the Ministry of
Finance, must defer to a privately operated, open and transparent,360 stock
market.361
As governance replaces government, the need for strong regulation of securi-
ties markets will continue, for without full disclosure of the ownership and fi-
356 See BOYCKO, SHLEIFER& VISHNY, supra note 10, at 130-31.
3
57 See Yevgenia Borisova, Rostelmash Tackles Massive Restructuring, Moscow TIMES
Sept. 28, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File.
358 See BOYCKO, SHLEIFER, & VISHNY, supra note 10, at 133.
359 "Shareholders need firmer and clearer control over corporations in Russia than they do
elsewhere because many Russian managers still consider themselves to have a right to com-
plete control." BLASI, KRouMovA & KRuSE, supra note 6, at 120.
360 See id. at 165 (so that shareholders will install board of directors that adopts a viable
restructuring strategy).
361 See BOYCKO, SHLEIFER, & VIsHNY, supra note 10, at 134
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nancial condition of the country's new corporations, outsiders are unlikely to
invest in them.
362
Changes such as these would initiate the process of taking power from
those who currently have it, and who do not want to lose it.363 Such power
is a source of personal wealth.364 The Russian revolution of 1992 was a
"velvet" revolution.
The Communist nomenklatura handed over political power practically
without a shot in exchange for effective ownership of the state assets tha . they
had administered on the Communist Party's behalf. When the music of com-
munism stopped, they kept their chairs.
[G]ranted complete freedom of political participation, the former Com-
munist nomenklatura successfully deployed its unmatched organizational re-
sources, skills, and solidarity to thwart and dilute the capitalist transition.
3 65
As one critic noted, "[t]he sad truth is that any country shedding commu-
nism has to contend with political volatility."
366
Russian governments must bind themselves to rules that do not permit
personal aggrandizement. Rather they must affect the governed in a formal
and impersonal manner.367 Great responsibility devolves upon the elector-
ate. Democracy, of which there is little or no tradition in Russia, 368 im-
362See BLAsI, KROUMOVA & KRUSE, supra note 6, at 120.
363 See Freedom i7 Journey: A Survey of the 20h Century, "Free to Be Poor," supra note
348, at 28 ("Government needs to set a clear and predictable regulatory and macroeconomic
climate: protecting property rights, enforcing the law, avoiding inflation and, just as impor-
tant, not grabbing all the money for itself").
36 See ECONOMIST, supra note 30, at 17, 18 ("ex-communists used legal, semi-legal and
illegal means to turn power into wealth, and then wealth into power").365 See Aron, supra note 22.
366 BoYcKo, SHLEIFER & VISHNY, supra note 10, at 155.
367 See Nichols, supra note 168, at 244:
Institutions can be characterized and categorized in a number of ways. One very impor-
tant distinction is between institutions that operate in an impersonal, formal manner and
those that operate in a more personal, relational manner. The distinction between formal
and relational is best framed in terms of how each type of institution facilitates relation-
ships.
The distinguishing feature of a formal institution is its personality. Persons who facilitate
relations through a formal institution need not have any prior relationship with one an-
other....
The distinguishing feature of a relational institution on the other hand, is its emphasis on
pre-existing relationships or the status or position of persons.368 See Strobe Talbott, The New Russia Special Report: A Miracle Wrapped in Danger,
TIME, Dec. 7, 1992 at 34.
Russia is actually in the throes of three transformations at once: from totalitarianism to
democracy, from a command economy to a free market and from a multinational empire
to a nation state. ... Russia is trying to cast off, virtually overnight, the legacy of more
than a thousand years of absolutism; and it is trying to create, virtually from scratch, the
institutions, traditions and political culture associated with the rule of law and popular
government.
Id.; see also Aron, supra note 22 (coincident emergence of Russian capitalism with electoral
democracy differs from pattern of western countries where capitalism developed first).
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poses upon the electorate a responsibility to demand accountability from
leaders.369 In some cases, real accountability may lead to counter-intuitive
results. Government measures to preserve jobs may appear to be the better
course, but in fact, such measures should be avoided. The essence of a
market economy or capitalism as described herein, i.e., maximization of
value, is the very thing that Russian governments have turned their backs
on. They do not seek value maximization-rather they pursue other goals,
some worthy and some not so worthy, but all counter-productive.
The solution to Russia's problems must come from within. The events
of the late 1990s have made clear though that there are no easy solutions.
Russia's choice to become a Western-style democracy "will not be made on
a single day by a coup or an election. Rather, it will evolve through the
many decisions made by Russia's millions of people."370 The cost of trans-
forming an economy from a centrally planned one to a market economy are
enormous. Moreover, these costs cannot be borne simply with massive in-
fusions of money.
Russia is in transition, in limbo. Such a position is a bad place to be
and a good place to moving away from.371
[Countries such as Russia] that have introduced partial reforms have begun the
process of dismantling the state's capacity to govern the economy according to
the requirements of the command system without developing the new institu-
tions on which a market-based form of governance could be established.
372
Russia must adapt to as well as adopt market oriented rules of law. A law is
never better than, and rarely worse than, the people who administer it.
373
The paper here traces the recent history of two matters--one involving
the Sidanko Oil Company and the other involving the Lomonosov Porcelain
Factory. To varying degrees, these matters illustrate the problems of law
and politics at work in Russia's transition to a market economy.
369 See Akins, supra note 171 (need for "ground up" political consensus; lack of political
consensus about making Russian economy a market economy).370 Yavlinsky, supra note 70, at 67.
371 See Aron, supra note 22 (Perestroika "left Russia in the worst of two worlds: between
the fatally undermined command economy and a still suppressed market").
372 Akin, supra note 171 (quoting EBRD "Transition Report 1999").
373 See Maria Rozhkova & Antony Robinson, Alfa r Aven Criticizes Lack ofLocal Ethics,
Moscow TIMEs, Apr. 22, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File (Alfa
Bank's president Pyotr Aven identifies "'soft-rights' that allow bureaucrats to interpret the
law as they see fit ... as a major source of government corruption").
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1. Example: the Matter of Sidanko Oil Company3 74
In late 1997 British Petroleum invested nearly $750 million in Sidanko
Oil Company (Russia's fourth largest oil company) and its various ventures,
thus making BP by far the largest foreign investor in Russia. Of that
amount, $571 million was for BP's stake in Sidanko itself. Prior to BP's
making this investment, UNEXIMbank (owned and controlled by oligarch
Vladimir Potanin) owned about 95% of Sidanko. Sidanko is actually a
holding company that controlled twelve trading companies and three spe-
cialized firms. Some of Sidanko's holdings are quite valuable because of
what they own or control, notably Chernogorneft, Sidanko's main produc-
tion unit. Sidanko (or its trading companies) no doubt engaged in unrealis-
374 These paragraphs were derived from news stories reporting on a day-to-day basis.
The following is a selected list of sources in chronological order: British Petroleum to Buy
into Russias Oil Holding, ITAI,-TAss, Nov. 17, 1997 (10% of Sidanko and 45% of Sidanko's
60% stake in Russia-Petroleum); Dmitry Zhdannikov, Focus - Russiafs Sidanko Faces
Bankruptcy Suit, REUTERS NEWS RELEASE, Jan. 29, 1999; Sebastian Alison, Russian Court to
Decide on Sidanko Oil Firm Tuesday, REUTERS NEWS RELEASE, May 17, 1999; Tyumen Oil
Says Keen to Buy Bankrupt Sidanko Subsidiary, REUTERS NEWS RELEASE, June 3, 1999; Rus-
sian Tyumen Offers to Buy Part of Sidanko Debt, REUTERS NEWS RELEASE, July 7, 1999; Fo-
cus -Sidanko Shareholders Reach Debt Agreement, REUTERS NEWS RELEASE, July 16, 1999;
Sebastian Alison, Feature - Problems Mount for Foreigners in Russian Oil, RETERS NEWS
RELEASE, Aug. 30, 1999; David Kramer, Ex-Im Scandal; Bank Has History of Bad Russian
Debt, WASHINGTON TIMES, Oct. 21, 1999, at A23; Sebastian Alison, Focus - Tyumen Buys
Sidanko Unit and Thwarts BP Amoco, REUTERS Bus. REP., Oct. 21, 1999; Russian Sidanko
Says Sale of Its Oil Unit Illegal, REUTERS NEWS RELEASE, Oct. 22, 1999; Sebastian Alison,
BP Amoco Says May Pull out of Russia, RUTERS BUS. REP., Nov. 4, 1999; Meera Selva,
City: BP Amoco Angered by Russian Sale Ruling, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 27, 1999; Russia
-Rules of War, ECONOMIST, Dec. 4, 1999, at 65; Brian Humphreys, Sidanko Still Mired Af-
ter Tyumen Deal, Moscow TIMES, Jan. 15, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Mostms File; Valeria Korchagina, Court Frees Sidanko From Bankruptcy, Moscow TIMES,
Jan. 29, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File; News Release, EBRD
Reaches Out of Court Settlement with Chernogorneft, Moscow TIMES, May 26, 2000, avail-
able at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File ($50 million loan to Chemogomeft repaid for
estimated $22 million after EBRD lost 17 court rulings); Igor Semenenko, A Guide to the Oil
Majors, Moscow TIMES, June 20, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File;
Alexander Tutushkin and Yelizaveta Osetinskaya, Sidanko s' New Manager Locked Out of
Subsidiary, Moscow TIMES, July 26, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File;
Lyuba Pronina, Ex-Foes TNK, Sidanko Mull Merger, Moscow TIMES, Aug. 4, 2000, avail-
able at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File; Lyuba Pronina, Sidanko Losing Control Over
Varyeganneftegaz, Moscow TIMES, Aug. 9, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Mostms File; Alla Startseva, Sidanko Shareholders Approve TNK Deal, Moscow TIMES
Aug. 26, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File (Sidanko shareholders ap-
prove issuance of sufficient shares to give Tyumen 25% + I of all shares and BP Amoco suf-
ficient shares to maintain its 10% stake); Anna Raff, Chernogorneft Drops TNK Lawsuit,
Moscow TIMES, Jan. 22, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File; cf. Patrick
Connole, TNK Loan Approved After Albright Blessing, Moscow TIMES, Apr. 8, 2000, avail-
able at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File (U.S. Export Import Bank approved $500 mil-
lion in loan guarantees for Tyumen to purchase U.S. made equipment and services and to
upgrade other facilities).
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tic transfer pricing whereby it bought what Chernogorneft had to sell at arti-
ficially low prices and sold at much higher market prices. As a result,
Chemogorneft owed substantial debts, but also possessed valuable re-
sources that should have made it quite profitable.
Potanin appointed Zia Bazhayev to run Sidanko; Bazhayev ran up sub-
stantial debts until he left the firm in March 1998. Sidanko was forced into
bankruptcy at the behest of a relatively small creditor because it too had
substantial debt ($343.3 million), over half of it owed to its own sharehold-
ers. Sidanko also owed substantial amounts to western creditors such as the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("EBRD") and the
United States Ex-Im Bank. Chernogorneft was also later forced into bank-
ruptcy. Sidanko's shareholders/creditors undertook to devise a restructuring
plan that would keep the company-and its most valuable units intact.
Sidanko has been subject to some of the more "interesting" aspects of
Russian bankruptcy. There has been an "us versus them" mentality pre-
vailing in many of the proceedings as (some) western creditors as well as
BP Amoco seek to preserve the company intact and make it a functioning
and profitable enterprise worthy of their investments, while Russian inter-
ests (not necessarily creditors) seek to maintain local control of the com-
pany, to keep Sidanko's least desirable units from becoming the wards of
local governments, and to transfer ownership of Chemogorneft to a Russian
company-thereby breaking up Sidanko to the great injury of BP Amoco
and one of the "oligarchs," Vladimir Potanin.
A competitor, the Tyumen Oil Company, saw an opportunity for itself
in Sidanko's financial woes. Tyumen was clearly interested in acquiring
Chernogorneft and did not particularly care about the financial well-being
of Sidanko. In a western country, such an entity might wait for the sale of
the bankrupt's estate and purchase assets (cheaply) at the bankruptcy sale.
In Russia, an entity such as Tyumen can take the initiative to obtain the
bankrupt's most desirable assets. Tyumen has been able to a substantial de-
gree to control the bankruptcy proceedings. It has done this by purchasing
for itself a seat at the creditors' table by paying various of Sidanko's debts
to-in some cases-certain carefully selected creditors. By doing this,
Tyumen has removed some of the creditors who might have opposed its de-
sire to acquire Chernogorneft thereby breaking up Sidanko. Tyumen suc-
ceeded in having the Arbitration Court appoint its choice of an external
manager, even though prior to Tyumen's presence at the creditors' table, the
other creditors had agreed on a particular external manager who was more
"objective" in dealing with the interests of western creditors. Specifically,
Tyumen purchased the debts owing by either Sidanko or Chernogorneft to
the United States Ex-Im Bank, the EBRD, and the German bank, WestLB.
Perhaps as a reward, the United States Ex-Im Bank has guaranteed substan-
tial loans to Tyumen, which of course greatly aided Tyumen in its takeover
efforts.
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Local courts have taken sides in this takeover battle in the ways that
they can. On July 29, 1999, a court in Nizhnevartovsk, Chernogomeft's
western Siberian base, ruled that the EBRD's registered debt should be re-
duced from $35 million to $26 million! The effect of this reduction was a
preference for non-western creditors. Moreover, the reduction reduced the
EBRD's voting rights at the creditor's meeting, thereby proportionately in-
creasing the voting rights of other creditors. Even while Sidanko creditors
apparently were working towards an amicable settlement whereby all
creditors would be paid in full and existing shareholders, especially BP
Amoco, would infuse more capital into Sidanko, Tyumen was busy obtain-
ing the assets of both Chemogorneft and Kondpetroleum (another Sidanko
holding) at auctions that it was able to get courts to order and at which any
interests opposed to itself were not allowed to be present. Tyumen bought
Kondpetroleum's assets at auction for $52 million; the notional starting
price for this subsidiary was $145 million. Its North Sea oil reserves were
valued at about 400 times what Tyumen paid. Tyumen bought Chernogor-
neft's assets at auction for $176 million; Chernogorneft in 1998 had output
worth $1.2 billion at current high oil prices. Chernogorneft's debts had
soared under the watchful eye of Tyumen's hand-picked external manager,
thereby reducing the value of the company.
Not surprisingly, BP Amoco has not viewed these developments with
much favor. It has been forced to write off $200 million of its $571 million
investment. BP Amoco in December 1999 was able to work out a settle-
ment with Tyumen whereby Tyumen agreed to return Chernogorneft's as-
sets to the Sidanko fold in return for a 25% plus one share blocking stake in
Sidanko.
The process may be repeated as 76% of the debt of another Sidanko
subsidiary, Varyeganneftegaz, has been acquired by an Alyans Group sub-
sidiary. Sidanko claims that it has paid all of Varyeganneftegaz's debts, to
which Alyans argues that Sidanko had no agreement with Varyegan-
neftegaz on debt repayment and that such an agreement would be subject to
approval by the creditors' meeting. The Khanty-Mansiisk arbitration court
has appointed Alyans's candidate as external manager. Varyeganneftegaz
processes 2.5 million tons of oil per year. This dispute has not been re-
solved.
In most countries, the developments in the Sidanko matter would be
legally unthinkable. The bankruptcy itself was initiated by what appeared
to be an insignificant creditor-which is often a prelude to asset-stripping
by insiders. The possibility of looting requires that non-favored creditors
move quickly in order to preserve the bankrupt's estate; the procedures
available to those who seek something other than an orderly winding up of
the company or a restructuring make such expedition very difficult to
achieve. The bankruptcy of Sidanko's key subsidiaries was itself the con-
sequence of artificially low transfer prices that they charged the parent
company in order to avoid local taxes and, no doubt, generate huge profits
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for the principals of favored trading companies. In a sense, Sidanko pre-
cipitated some of its own problems. Some creditors have been preferred
over others. Tyumen's purchase of the assets of Chernogorneft and Kond-
petroleum in any country but Russia would constitute a fraudulent convey-
ance. The outside interference of Tyumen considerably damages the
position of a western equity holder, BP Amoco, in this highly charged po-
litical affair. Surely the politically charged atmosphere of this proceeding,
the vulture-like behavior of Tyumen, and discrimination against western
interests by Russian courts and governments-are not conducive to encour-
aging more western investment--even though things appear to have
reached a state of equilibrium.
2. Example: the Matter of the Lomonosov Porcelain Factory
When the Lomonosov Porcelain Factory was privatized, the managers
and workers took its shares. The firm paid its workers with the products
that they, the workers, had made. The products were objects made from
Lomonosov porcelain for which there is substantial demand in the West.
The firm should have been profitable enough to pay wages in money. Ap-
parently, the Factory's mangers sold its output cheaply to middlemen, i.e.,
"trading companies," who in turn resold it at hefty profits. The profits were
then diverted, at least in part, to the factory's managers. In this case, a
worker-shareholder did agitate among his fellow worker-shareholders, but
they were not sympathetic. The worker-shareholder left the company and
was eventually able to sell his shares to a Russian brokerage which soon
was able to purchase more shares from other workers. The Russian broker-
age in turn sold the shares at a substantial profit to investors, including the
USA-Russia Fund. The Fund learned of management theft from the com-
pany and filed a complaint with Russian prosecutors. Management re-
sponded by seeking re-nationalization on the grounds that its own takeover
of the company had not been lawful.375 The Nevsky Regional Civil Court
ruled the Westerners' takeover of the board of directors was legal, 376 but the
St. Petersburg Arbitration Court ruled in a dispute between the State Prop-
erty Ministry and Lomonosov in October 1999 that the privatization of Lo-
monosov was not legal.377 In March 2000, the Northwestern Regional
Arbitration Court reversed the decision of the St. Petersburg Arbitration
375 These events are described at Richard C. Paddock, Lomonosov Ruling Frightens In-
vestors, Moscow TiMes, Dec. 14, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File.376 See Kristina Shevory, Court Rules in Favor of New Lomonosov Board, Moscow
TIMEs, Feb. 9, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File.
377 See Andrew McChesney, Investor Fights Porcelain Verdict, Moscow TIMES, Oct. 13,
1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File. Hopefully there will be no offensive
collateral estoppel without mutuality.
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Court, although representatives of the Factory's former administration
vowed to appeal.378
These events demonstrate the apparent ineffectiveness of what should
be a Russian counterpart to a shareholder derivative action. Shareholder
complacency, particularly worker-shareholder complacency, 379 is no doubt
partly the result of a legal system that does not protect shareholder rights;380
here was a case where a shareholder actually did seek accountability of
management for profits, mismanagement, etc. The case presents a test of
whether legal rules that protect shareholders' rights actually work. The re-
sults are not entirely reassuring.
3. Comment
These two matters, Sidanko and Lomonosov, illustrate several points.
First, Russia may eventually "get it right." Eventually BP Amoco obtained
what hopefully is a satisfactory resolution of the Sidanko bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. Eventually, corrupt Lomonosov management lost control of the
profitable corporation in what was essentially a takeover. But too often an
appellate court must be called upon to set things right. Moreover, local
courts do not learn from reversals because they in fact favor one side over
the other. The scare that the Russians throw into western interests is more
than what most western investors are willing to tolerate, especially when
there are superior investment alternatives. The outcomes in these two mat-
ters were obtained only after some explicit and implicit threats, the conse-
quences of which the Russians would regard as worse than the alternatives.
BP Amoco threatened to leave Russia altogether. BP Amoco has written
off much of its investment already, so its cost of exit has already been re-
378 See Kristina Shevory, Lomonosov Ruling Favors Investors, Moscow TIMES, Mar. 3,
2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File.
379 Employers and mid-level managers are now the dominant block-holders in Russia.
Ironically, it is these insiders who have put up the biggest barriers to shareholders' rights.
Most Russian trade unions and employee groups have been embarrassing failures as rep-
resentatives and have not attempted to ind independent outside board members with
business training to represent their members' shareholdings. At the same time, managers
have worked ardently and successfully to block attempts by employee shareholders to ex-
ercise their rights. Employees can be fired for selling their shares to an outsider or for
attempting to institute cumulative voting to elect independent board representatives. De-
spite the fact that Russia now leads the world in employee shareholding, the country that
so recently called itself the "workers' state" does not legally protect workers' shareholder
rights.
BLASI, KROUMOvA & KRUSE, supra note 6, at 152.
380 See Baev, supra note 31, at 232 (noting inadequate disclosure and anti-fraud protec-
tion for investors); Neela Benerjee, Will Minority Shareholders at UES Be Next?, Moscow
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File (describing abuses of
shareholders and questioning recent execution of a merger of a Unified Energy Systems
(UES) (run by Anatoly Chubais) subsidiary with an aluminum conglomerate); Russian
Shares: Hot Shares Bothered Investors, ECONOMIST, July 24, 1999, at 64 (describing abuses
of shareholders that include failure to inform shareholders of important matters, dilution,
dividend delays, diversion of cash, and asset-stripping).
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duced. With regard to Lomonosov, Russian courts' treatment of the west-
erners' board of directors who accomplished exactly what should be ac-
complished in a market economy-bad management is ousted by new
shareholders who value new management more than the old-is likely to
affect western investors' behavior towards Russia for years to come. 38 1
Second, and related to the first point, western investors may or not be
risk averse-but they want risk that they understand.382 Great risk should
hold the promise of great payoffs. Even when a risk should be relatively
low, e.g., the Lomonosov firm should be profitable without significant
risk-indeed it was profitable to workers despite egregious mismanage-
ment-Russians seem able to create unforeseeable risks. Acknowledging
these risks may simply be one part of a steep learning curve. For example,
in American bankruptcy law and procedure, there is little to be gained by
becoming a creditor, especially after initiation of the bankruptcy proceed-
ing, simply to have a seat at the creditors' table. Yet Tyumen proved that
this can indeed be attractive and profitable. Thus Russian bankruptcy may
function-inappropriately in the minds of most westerners-as a means of
effectuating a corporate takeover.38 3 This would hardly be the first time in
world history that bankruptcy laws served a purpose other than those pur-
poses for which they were intended. Numerous solvent debtors have used
the American bankruptcy laws in order to take advantage of the automatic
stay on creditors' claims upon filing a petition in bankruptcy. A cynic
might argue that this is simply part of the learning curve for western inves-
tors, i.e., that Russian bankruptcy laws should be treated as part of the cor-
poration code, not merely as a law governing insolvency. But most western
investors would conclude that the risk of Russian lawlessness or Russian
abuse of law is simply a risk that cannot be quantified. If not quantifiable
even in a comparative sense against other investment risks, the easiest thing
for western investors to do is to walk away and invest elsewhere.
Third, Russian attitudes towards western investors is still highly politi-
cally charged. There is fear about losing control to western interests. Rus-
sians are hardly alone in this sentiment, but the Russians take it to the point
381 See Lee S. Wolosky, Putin S Plutocrat Problem, 79 FOREIGN AF. 18, 24 (March-April
2000) ("Investor fear has a ripple effect ... Widely publicized misconduct involving Russia's
largest companies and most prominent business leaders scares away international investors
from all Russian companies - including those with no intention of defrauding anyone").
382 Cf. Black & Kraakman, supra note 342, at 1922-23 (ownership structure of many
corporations present clear risk of opportunism towards outside shareholders; investors dis-
count value of shares so much that equity markets virtually paralyzed; investors may simi-
larly over-react to corporate scandals).
383 See Igor Semenenko, Crystal Firm to Appeal Ruling, Moscow TIMES, Aug. 30, 2000,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File (accusation of takeover effort in bankruptcy
proceeding of Gusevsky Crystal Factory); Tavemese, supra note 228 (detailing case of No-
vokuznetsk Aluminum).
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of making their industries unattractive as investments. 384 As a result, in
"recent years Russia has received less direct investment than has Peru."
'3 85
Fourth, the Russian economy is likely to grow outside of and despite
the legal and political systems. The erratic performance of the Russian
court system causes western investors to avoid it. Western investors natu-
rally prefer dispute resolution to occur through arbitration outside of Russia.
Russian economic interests will develop to the extent that government in-
terests stop intervening in the economy. This in fact is the pattern of devel-
opment in most countries. The market economy develops first, and the
political system develops to serve that economy. This process can take
hundreds of years. As already noted, the Russians are "trying to do every-
thing at once." Even so, development of the economy will occur first. The
time frame is compressed compared to that of western nations, but hope-
fully the task is not too formidable when there is an understanding of just
what that task is.
There are signs of a market economy emerging from the "bottom up."
Solutions to problems are indeed emerging-slowly-from outside gov-
ernment and from outside the old system that did not work. For example,
the credit necessary for such an emergence might come from small compa-
nies themselves as industry invests in itself. Customers invest in suppliers.
Eventually Russia will need a healthy banking system, but such ingenuity
buys time.
3 8 6
A move to break the downward spiral of a barter economy is the crea-
tion of a market in veksels, or IOUs. Investors in fact have begun to specu-
late in veksels.3 87 Such speculation may be the first step towards the
emergence of a junk bond market. An orderly bond market would, at least
for those firms finally sound enough to take advantage of it, reduce the
enormous transaction costs associated with a barter economy. Firms able to
issue bonds would have a source of cash with which to carry on their busi-
nesses. The Association of Members of the Veksel Market ("AUVER," or
"Association"), a group of banks and brokerages, hopes to create an orderly
market in veksels, a market whose daily turnover is ten times that of the
stock market.38 8 The Association hopes to make the market more transpar-
3" The South African diamond firm, De Beers, recently abandoned its $100 million in-
vestment in the Russian diamond market without much hope of recouping its investment.
Vitaly Basygov, deputy head of the Duma's natural resources committee, said, "The diamond
industry is one of the most successful in the national economy, so there is no need to give the
best sites to foreign companies." This type of thinking implies that only the most undesir-
able enterprises should be available to western investors. See Semenenko, supra note 180.385 See Wolosky, supra note 381, at 24.
386 See Higgins, supra note 83 (citing examples ofjuice company loaning money to farm,
and pulp and paper company loaning money to logging company).
387 See Andrews, supra note 97 (describes emergence of investment market for veksels).
38 See Andrew McChesney, FSC Grabs IOU Bull by Horns, Moscow TIMES, Jan. 19,
2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File (veksel market valued at $21 billion).
Russia's Intractable Economic Problems and the Next Steps in Legal Reform
21:1 (2000)
ent and thereby encourage more investment from the West because various
risks associated with investing in nontransparent investment vehicles would
be eliminated.
3 89
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL COMMENTS
Now is the best time in many years for meaningful legal and market re-
form of the sort herein described to occur. There are reasons to be optimis-
tic. In the first year of the new bankruptcy act's existence, bankruptcy
filings increased five-fold.39° Even some prominent firms have been caught
up in this.391 Other firms are restructuring.392 The world price of oil has
doubled and even tripled since 1998; this has brought more than $1 bil-
lion/month into the Russian economy.3 93 The Russian government is col-
lecting taxes. 394 Taxes collected from oil and gas companies plus the
collection of a relatively recently imposed tariff on oil exports have in-
creased government revenues significantly; fuel and energy provide 20% of
the federal budget's revenues and 40% of the nation's hard currency.
3 95
Moreover, the ruble has taken such a pounding that efficient domestic firms
389 See Andrew McChesney, Veksel Trade Rules Set to Lure Investors, Moscow TIMEs,
Jan. 22, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostnis File (describing formation, pur-
pose, and goals of AUVER).
390 See More Bankruptcy Cases Reported in Russia, Russ. AND COMMONWEALTH Bus. L.
REP., Apr. 21, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, RCBLR File.
391 See Catherine Belton, Court Declares Menatep Bankrupt, Moscow TIMEs, Sept. 30,
1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File (discussing "former banking power-
house Menatep[,] one of [Russia's] major oligarchic institution"); Inkombank Declared
Bankrupt, Moscow TIMEs, Feb. 3, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File
(Inkombank).392 See Jason Bush, Russia S New Dawn, Bus. CENT. EuR. (March-April 2000), available
at http:llwww.bcemag.com/y2OOO/marO0/cover/O003cover.htm (Sibneft Oil Company, Vim-
pelcom Mobile Phone Company, Siberian Aluminum, and Yaroslavl Tyre Plant); Igor Se-
menenko, Glass Industry Recast to Make Profit, Moscow TiMEs, Mar. 15, 2000, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File (Gus-Khrustalny glass and crystal factory); Anna
Shcherbakova, Machine-Building Giant Draws Up Survival Plan, Moscow TIMEs, Oct. 9,
1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File ("machine-building giant Izhorskiye
Works").
393 See Yevgenia Borisova, Oil at $25 Brings in Massive Windfall, Moscow TIMEs, Nov.
17, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File; Valeria Korchagina, Firming Oil
Prices Boon for Budget, Moscow TIMEs, May 5, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Mostmns File.
394 See Associated Press, In Brief, Moscow TIMES, May 4, 2000, available at LEXIS,
News Library, Mostms File (budget surplus of $850 million for first four months of 2000);
see also Yevgenia Borisova, Minister: Tax Take Should Stabilize at 9% of GDP, Moscow
TiMES, Jan. 15, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostmns File (collections have ex-
ceeded targets, targets have increased, and a higher percentage of taxes due are actually col-
lected).395 See Borisova, supra note 393 (unfortunately the war in Chechnya is devouring much
of the windfall).
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are able to produce goods profitably396 because Russian consumers simply
can no longer afford as many foreign goods. This is an opportune time to
make the bankruptcy laws work so that Russia's most efficient firms actu-
ally prosper rather than drown in a sea of more efficient foreign competi-
tors. Thus, Russia's financial collapse may turn out to be a "blessing in
disguise," at least for those in the real economy.397 Of course restructuring
must be real.3 98
An import-substitution recovery that generates glowing economic
numbers, but without real reform eventually amounts to nothing. Such a
"recovery" relies on what economists refer to as "inferior goods," i.e., goods
for which demand increases as consumer income decreases. Certainly Rus-
sia should not count on world oil prices to remain artificially high. Nor is a
currency that steadily declines in value, thereby improving the outlook for
domestic producers and exporters, the basis upon which a strong economy
is built. The IMF notably has begun to insist on evidence of real change in
Russia before extending more loans, even at a time when economic indica-
tors have turned upward.399 The IMF delayed release of a $640 million
tranche in late 1999. Alexander Livshits explained: "The IMF tranche is
not only money.. .it is a tranche of trust."400 A sobering indication that eco-
nomic reform is not real is the increase in capital flight that has occurred
when times got better.40 1 The oil windfall presents an opportunity to hasten
the move towards a market economy and to pay international and domestic
debts. Focus is required lest oil revenues become simply the means of fa-
396 See IMF Says Reforms Key to Recovery, Moscow TnMEs, Sept. 24, 1999, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File, quoting Michael Mussa ("There has been a surge in
output behind the protection of a depreciated exchanged rate").
397 See Killen, supra note 71.
391 See Russia: Sweetly Flows the Volga, ECONOMIST, June 5, 1999, at 62 (citing success
of Nestle and Avtovaz in Samara and noting failure of most companies to take advantage of
situation; sales to the bankrupt sector and management theft from companies continue); see
also Arnold, supra note 20 (devaluation helps cushion blow of crisis, but increased domestic
sales "only prolong the delusion that Russian manufacturers are viable without reform").
399 See Catherine Belton, IMF Questions Will to Reform, Moscow TIMES, May 16, 2000,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File (key changes include tax reform, reduction
of industry subsidization by regional governments, strengthening the social safety net, eradi-
cation of non-payments, and restructuring industries that survive on subsidies).
400 Celestine Bohlen, Russia Stuck in IMF's Bad Books, Moscow TIMES, Nov. 9, 1999,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File (noting improvements in GDP, tax revenues
paid in cash, paid-up pensions, trade surplus).
401 See Catherine Belton, $2.9 Bin a Month Flows Out of Russia, Moscow TIMEs, Nov.
23, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File ("it would be difficult to stop the
damaging outflow without root and branch restructuring of the Russian economy).
The World Bank has expressed concern over the slow progress in reform of the corporate
and financial sectors - as well as continued capital flight. See Igor Semenenko, Bank-
Growth Rate to Dry Up, Moscow TIMEs, April 12, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Mostms File (reporting on World Bank's "Global Development Finance 2000" in which
World Bank predicts a slowing of economic growth in Russia and surrounding region).
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cilitating war in Chechnya, electing particular politicians, and dispensing
political favors to particular businesses.40 2 It is the most opportune time
that there will ever be to use the bankruptcy law aggressively so that the
rewards of efficiency are clear and the cost of inefficiency and failure to re-
structure is exit that is both unavoidable and highly visible. But the oppor-
tunity will not last long; indeed, the opportunity for meaningful
restructuring may already be passing.40 3 Exports, largely of raw materials,
have increased because of the weak ruble, but the rate of increase is slow-
ing. Russian consumers simply do not possess sufficient wealth to sustain
the growth, and Russian manufactured products lack the quality necessary
to compete in the export market. There are signs that the ruble, which fell
from roughly 6 to the dollar to 25 to the dollar in August 1998, is weaken-
ing again.
404
On December 31, 1999, Boris Yeltsin announced his resignation from
the presidency of Russia and appointed Vladimir Putin interim president.
Mr. Putin handily won the election of March 26, 2000. There are encour-
aging signs, both that Mr. Putin recognizes the problems identified herein
with the Russian economy and that he is willing to address such problems
forcefully.40 5 Of course caution is required whenever evaluating any
promises of Russian leaders concerning future handling of the Russian
economy. Mr. Putin was a KGB agent who served in East Germany. He
appears to be focused on ends without necessarily caring about means,
40 6
i.e., the balance between individual freedoms and public order.40 7 Russia
has rarely, if ever,40 8 had what citizens of other countries would regard as
an acceptable level of personal freedoms. But some of President Putin's
initiatives deserve comment.
402 See Yevgeny Borisova, Putin Hits Political Jackpot In Oil Boom, Moscow TIMES,
Nov. 18, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File (speculating that top priori-
ties are Chechnya and elections; unpaid wages become top priority only when people block
railways).403 See Catherine Belton, Lessons of Aug. 17 Crash Not Learned, Moscow TIMES, Aug.
17, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File (noting especially the failure to
restructure Russian banks); Michael Wines, Factorys Turnaround Reflects a Glimmer in
Russia 's Economy, N.Y. TIMES, June 2,2000, at Al.
"04 See Julia Tolkacheva, Central Bank Steps In to Support Ruble, Moscow TIMES, Aug.
31, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File.
405 See Yevgenia Albats, Power Play: Reform Military to Cure Nation s Cancer,
Moscow TIMES, Aug. 31, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File (Putin "the
first Russian leader to publicly acknowledge the disastrous state of the country").
41 "We have a fighter who has come to power and whose nature is not to play, but to win.
He not only is motivated to succeed, he is maniacally motivated to succeed." Patrick E. Ty-
ler, Russians Wonder ifPutin Accepts Limits to Power, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2000, at Al
(quoting Professor Aleksandr B. Asmolov, psychologist at Moscow State University).407 See Tyler, supra note 406 (quoting Aleksandr I. Gelman).
408 Perhaps from February 1917 to October 1917.
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First, Mr. Putin recognizes the unruliness of Russia's 89 provincial
governors, many of whom have openly defied federal laws. Mr. Putin is
endeavoring to relocate the locus of economic authority towards the Krem-
lin. He has divided the country into seven federal districts, each with a
presidential representative who in turn has representatives or deputies in the
larger cities. 409 The new representatives report directly to the president.
Clearly this move is designed to weaken the authority of the provincial
governors. Previously, President Yeltsin had personal envoys to each of the
89 provinces. Unfortunately these envoys received benefits (e.g., salary, of-
fice space, jobs for family members, summer camps for their children) and
some salary from local governments-which essentially led to their co-
option. Repeated restructurings that occur with every new leader are a fa-
miliar feature of Russian history-as is the co-option of the national repre-
sentatives by the local authorities. The new representatives receive their
salary and budget from the Kremlin. Recognition that a federalist system is
out of balance does not mean that balance is easily restored. Provincial
governors have professed enthusiasm for the plan-an indication that they
might not feel particularly threatened by a plan that is aimed directly at their
powers. Mr. Putin and his representatives must still gain and exercise suffi-
cient power and earn sufficient respect for this system in order to bring the
unlawfulness of local governors under control. This may include the power
to terminate regional governors who flout federal law or the Constitution.
Moreover, removal of the governors from the Federation Council so that
such governors as a group cannot exercise even a negative power of veto
over federal legislation may be necessary. Such removal might require
amending Article 95 of the Russian Constitution. When the matter has
come up for a vote, the Duma (lower house) has strongly endorsed legisla-
tion to strip governors of their seat in the Federation Council; unsurpris-
ingly, the Federation Council has resisted, but the Duma has sufficient votes
to overcome the veto.
Second, President Putin established a think tank, the Center for Strate-
gic Planning. In early 2000, the Center produced a plan for the Russian
economy,4 10 whose policy thrust is the creation of "'conditions for the
409 This developing story is described at, in chronological order: Michael Wines, Putin
Decrees New Controls and Envoys for Provinces, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2000, at A9; Sarah
Karush, Putin Carves Country Into 7 Districts, MOSCOW TIMES, May 16, 2000, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File; Michael Wines, Putin s Move on Governors Would
Bolster His Role, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2000, at A3; Maura Reynolds, Putin Address Details
Nation 's Woes, Moscow TIMES, July 11, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms
File (coverage of President Putin's state of the union address of July 8, 2000); Tyler, supra
note 406; The Bridling of Russia's Regions, ECONOMIST Nov. 11, 2000, available at 2000 WL
8144332.
410 This story is described at, in chronological order: Catherine Belton, Plan for the
Economy, Moscow TIMES, May 23, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostmis;
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emergence of the effective private sector."' 411 The features of the plan are
the following:
" Reducing taxes by introducing a flat 13% income tax, eliminating
the turnover tax, reducing payroll payments to social funds to
35%, and allowing deductions for business-related expenses;
* Reducing state spending to 30% of GDP. Payments for social
needs will not decrease, but their percentage of GDP will decrease
as the economy and the tax base grow;
" Reducing or eliminating state subsidies to businesses, especially
non-cash subsidies such as low energy tariffs, and providing tem-
porary unemployment benefits for laid off workers and funds to
local authorities in company towns for maintenance of kindergar-
tens, schools, and hospitals that were previously funded by non-
viable firms;
* Eliminating social subsidies that the government never funds and
eliminating housing subsidies;
* Privatizing management, maintenance, and utilities related to
housing;
* Reallocating expenditures on subsidies to health, education, and
defense;
* Separating the state from commercial interests, especially with re-
spect to the Railroad Ministry, Gazprom, and Unified Energy
Systems;
" Privatizing more state-owned enterprises, including all profitable
coal mines, and creating joint stock companies of most of the re-
maining state-owned enterprises with the state retaining an inter-
est;
* Eliminating price fixing agreements between natural monopoly
cartels and sales services;
* Requiring businesses to adopt international accounting standards;
• Equalizing taxes on banks and corporations by lowering the profit
tax on banks thereby decreasing the disincentive of banks to con-
ceal profits;
* Requiring the Central Bank to phase out its holding of financial
stakes in commercial banks at home and abroad;
* Allowing the Central Bank to draw up restructuring plans for the
financial sector;
* Regulating off-shore operations in order to reduce capital flight;
* Improving the court system in order to protect investors' and citi-
zens' rights;
* Simplifying the registration of businesses;
* Introducing clearly understood limitations of authority for local of-
ficials in order to reduce arbitrary bureaucratic action;
Aron, supra note 13; Michael Wines, Russia Unveils a Bold Economic Blueprint, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 29, 2000, at A6.
411 Aron, supra note 13 (quoting report).
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* Establishing a market for the free sale of land, thereby hopefully
inducing investment in mortgages and the construction of much
needed housing;
" Making the pension age 65 for both men and women and intro-
ducing accumulative pension accounts funded by tax-deductible
contributions up to a specified limit;
* Increasing the salaries of officials, including substantial increases
for judges, in order to reduce the incentive to engage in corrupt
practices-coupled with a substantial decrease in the number of
state workers.
Implementation of all of these measures would certainly change the social
contract, i.e., the Russian notion of entitlements, from the one described
earlier in this paper. The plan envisions that market competition will be the
"key regulator of economic development,"412 not the state-a truly remark-
able transformation should it actually come to fruition. The state is to be-
come the servant of society.
Because the plan would be so dramatic in its impact, there is reason to
be concerned about its realization---even in part. As an initial matter, Mr.
Putin must of course sign on. In his state of the union address of July 8,
2000, President Putin expressed strong support for the plan's substance 413
and is preparing legislation to implement various aspects of the plan.4 14
Moreover, the Duma appears to be signing on rather than succumbing to the
opposition of the Communists, trade unionists, and regional administra-
tors,415 although opposition to significant reforms has certainly not disap-
peared.41
6
Third, Mr. Putin evidently has undertaken to do something about the
oligarchs.417 Measures have included filing tax evasion charges, demands
412 id.
4 13 See Brian Killen, Putin Says Economy Soft, Growth Fragile, Moscow TIMES, July 11,
2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File (reporting on speech); Reynolds, su-
pra note 409.
414 See Tyler, supra note 406 (legislation to reform customs laws, the legal system, and
law enforcement agencies).415 In chronological order, see Wines, supra note 410, at A6; Peter Graff, Duma Bows to
President Over Social Funds, Moscow TIMES, June 10, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Mostns File (Duma approving unification and reduction of various social taxes); Igor
Semenenko, Key Pension Changes Mulled, Moscow TIMES, Sept. 2, 2000, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Mostrns File (Duma turning its attention to various plans to reform
Russian pensions).
416 See Aron, supra note 13 (identifying state-owned monopolies, directors of subsidized
and tax-exempt enterprises, bureaucrats who supplement their incomes through taxation,
communist-affiliated trade unions, workers at unprofitable enterprises, those who will lose
housing subsidies - as sources of opposition).
417 This paragraph is drawn from, in chronological order: Michael Wines, Russian Puzzle:
What Does War on Tycoons Mean?, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2000, at A3; Putin Gets a Grip,
EcoNoMisT, Aug. 5, 2000, at 47-48; Igor Semenenko, Oligarchs Feeling Kremlin Squeeze,
Moscow TIMES, Aug. 8, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Mostms File.
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that they pay money that they allegedly shorted the government in acquiring
their properties, raids on and searches of offices, and an occasional arrest
(followed shortly by a release). As mentioned earlier, the oligarchs' control
of wealth does not affect the amount of wealth in Russia, but it obviously is
one particular distribution of that wealth. There is little reason to favor this
particular distribution rather than just about any other. The loan-for-shares
program assured that the government itself would be far more destitute than
necessary-to say nothing of the many who were denied any opportunity to
bid on the choice properties that were distributed in that program. Mr.
Putin's government does not appear to be able or willing to destroy any of
the oligarchs, but it does seem quite interested in enforcing rules that re-
quire the oligarchs to pay their fair share of taxes. For some who have be-
come accustomed to tax evasion and government favors, this may seem like
an attack or a crackdown. To the extent the government is successful,
moves against the oligarchs are politically very popular. So long as the
government moves against oligarchs only to get them to disgorge ill-gotten
gains, there is little reason to complain. But it would be counter-productive
to sweep outside investors up in a crusade of confiscation against thieves.
In late summer and early fall 2000, three tragedies befell Russia. Ter-
rorists bombed a Metro station in Moscow, the Kursk submarine sank kill-
ing 118 sailors, and a fire on the Ostankino television tower took still more
lives. The tragedies in a sense demonstrate how rotted Russia's infrastruc-
ture has become. These are highly visible events. There are others. Russia
cannot feed its diminishing population. The war in Chechnya drags on.
Bombs go off in other cities, often in crowded marketplaces. President
Putin's style is clearly authoritarian. There is, nevertheless, a brink that
Putin cannot pass over. He learned this in his handling of the Kursk affair,
i.e., the public outcry to his not interrupting his Crimean vacation while
Russian rescue efforts proved clumsy and ineffective. The fact that there
was such an outcry is an indication that Russian citizens may demand both
more responsive government and more competent government.
4 18 Top-
down implementation of necessary reforms remains the appropriate
course.4 19 Alexander Kerensky's Provisional Government tried to imple-
418 See Putin S Sea of Troubles, ECONOMIST, Aug. 26, 2000, at 13 ("loss of the Kursk, and
the bungling that followed ... may yet make Russians think about the sort of government they
deserve").
419 Putin has it right, for the defining feature of Russian developments for the past decade
or more has notbeen progress or setbacks on the path of reform, the focus of so much
Western commentary, but the fragmentation, degeneration, and erosion of state power.
During that time, a fragile Russian state of uncertain legitimacy has ,own even weaker
as a consequence of deliberate, if misguided, policies, bitter anddebilitating struggles for
political power, and simple theft of state assets. The erosion of the state has reached such
depths that the central state apparatus, or the center, as it is commonly called in Russia,
has little remaining capacity to mobilize resources for national purposes, either at home
or abroad, while most regional and local governments lack the resources - and in some
cases the desire - to govern effectively. The obvious weakness of the state has, not sur-
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ment reforms from the bottom up in 1917,420 and the result was a 75-year
odyssey of economic disaster. But implementation of reforms must be
even-handed and responsive. That mean de-politicizing business and forc-
ing insolvent firns into bankruptcy.
prisingly, fueled fears about Russia's stability, integrity, and for some Russians, its sur-
vival.
THOMAS E. GRAHAM, JR., The Fate of the Russian State, 8 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA 354, 354
(2000).
420 See B.H. SUMNER, A SHORT HISTORY OF RussIA 361 (1949):
The Revolution of March 1917, in the midst of war, opened the sluice-gates of liberty:
freedom to say and write anything and everything, to form committees on anything and
everything, to work or not to work; soon also freedom to take the land, take the factories,
go home, stop fighting. This new, intoxicating liberty became anarchy; authority was
more and more repudiated unless it claimed to be exercised in the name of the "workers,
peasants, soldiers and sailors," and frequently even when it did so claim.
See also BERNARD PARES, A HISTORY OF RUSSIA 490 (Definitive Ed. 1953) (initiative for
revolution was crowds on the streets; right to direct the country disputed).
